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L’objectif de cette étude vise à comprendre comment les compagnies d’assurance 
Canadienne conceptualisent les cyber risques afin d’être en mesure de quantifier des pertes 
résiduelles ou en constante évolution. Par l’entremise de 10 entretiens qualitatif avec des 
professionnel de l’assurance, nous avons trouvé que la souscription à une cyber assurance peut 
aider les entrepreneurs à gérer les risques causés par la cyber criminalité. L’étude montre que la 
cyber assurance contribue à la compréhension et à la diffusion de connaissance en matière de 
cybercriminalité.  Ceci est facilité par la recherche continue sur le phénomène et de la mise à jour 
ces polices d’assurance. Aussi, il a été trouvé que les professionnels de l’assurance facilitent 
l’application des mesures de prévention cyber. Cette gestion est permise grâce aux outils mis à 
disposition des assureurs afin d’évaluer les composantes de sécurité pour contrer les cyber 
attaques. Finalement, la recherche démontre que le milieu des assurances joue un rôle d’envergure 
dans la surveillance et la gouvernance des cyber risques.   
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The goal of this research is to understand how Canadian insurance companies 
conceptualize cyber risks to quantify a residual or evolving loss. Through ten qualitative semi-
structured interviews conducted with insurance professionals throughout Canada, we found that 
the purchase of cyber coverage contributes to the risk management efforts. Companies are 
increasingly looking to implement or enhance their cyber security measures through cyber 
insurance. In fact, the study found that cyber insurance can serve three purposes. The first is that 
it allows for a better understanding and diffusion of knowledge through the continuous research 
on cybercrimes and the revision of cyber policies. The second finding is that insurance 
professionals work with companies to assess and facilitate the integration of preventive measures. 
This is based on the tools they use to asses a company’s cyber security infrastructure. Finally, the 
study found that insurance companies have a considerable societal impact on the surveillance and 
governance of cybercrimes.  
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PlayStation, Target, Home Depot, Ashley Madison and JPMorgan Chase were all victims 
of cyber attacks. These attacks have not only exposed the companies’ vulnerable security measures 
but also compromised considerable amounts of customers’ personal information. As a result, 
cybercrimes came under a substantial amount of scrutiny from media outlets which, in turn, created 
interpersonal fear among online users and pushed companies to consider different strategies to 
strengthen their security measures. Moreover, targeted companies, including those noted above, 
have found themselves with several class action lawsuits and millions of dollars in restitution to 
pay their clients. These financial consequences may explain why a company like PlayStation has 
turned to insurance companies for indemnification for their losses. Yet, several policy complexities 
have made it possible that insurance companies are not legally obliged to pay for all losses incurred 
from a cyber attack. (see Sony Corp. of America vs. Zurich American Insurance Co.). 
 Several reasons were outlined as to why Zurich did not have to pay for the losses incurred. 
Amongst these reasons, Yu (2014) noted that the commercial general liability (CGL) did not 
consider cybercrimes as a tangible loss. Research also argued that the innovative nature of 
cybercrimes prevents insurance companies from having the data they need to provide adequate 
coverage for their clients (Shackelford, 2012; Drouin, 2014). Gordon, Loeb and Sohail (2003) also 
mention that there is an uncertainty of the markets covered by these cyber insurance policies. Based 
on these suggestions, risk theorists, such as Beck (1992), are concerned that major technological 
events are uninsurable (Beck, 1992). According to Ericson and Doyle (2004), uncertainty is 
defined as “the lack of secure knowledge about an unwanted outcome. Insecure knowledge is a 
result of unavailable or unreliable data about frequency and severity” (p.12). For Beck (1992) 
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major technological catastrophes are not restricted to the time and space of the incident. Rather, 
the origin of such uncertainties extend beyond physical space. In their nature, the afflictions 
produced by cyber attacks are not tied to a physical space. The prescriptive concept of accident 
and medical insurance does not adequately fit with the basic dimensions of modern threats. Despite 
these suggested limits, Ericson and Doyle (2004) argue that each business line of insurance, 
whether it is commercial, home or life, are facing issues with the availability of scientific 
knowledge, underwriting practices, loss prevention approaches and claims management. To 
address these limits, each business line requires “different approaches to risk, attributions of 
responsibility for risk, and abilities to respond to uncertainties” (Ericson and Doyle. 2004, p.19). 
New global risks, such as cybercrime, may be difficult to evaluate. The insurance industry can no 
longer rely entirely on conventional actuarial and risk analysis processes. Thus, the objective of 
this research is to understand how Canadian insurance companies conceptualize cyber risks to 
quantify a residual or evolving loss. This research will analyze the practices of insurance 
companies used to deal with the uncertainties of cybercrime to insure their clients. By doing so, 
this will help us to determine the challenges faced by different actors in the insurance industry, the 
divergent opinions on the matter and the techniques used to manage this new form of risk. The 
research will use a qualitative approach by conducting ten semi-structured interviews with 
insurance professionals. 
 The first chapter of the research, the literature review, will explore the fundamentals of 
traditional insurance and cyber insurance and its place in the risk society. Additionally, this section 
will also look at the difficulties encountered by insurance professionals when dealing with 
cybercrime coverages. Following this assessment, the second chapter will be dedicated to the 
methodology. As previously mentioned, the Grounded Theory was favoured in order to find knew 
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concepts of cyber insurance products and their pertinence for risk management. It will also 
describe how the Grounded Theory was applied to extract significant information during the 
analysis of the interviews.  
 The third chapter will present the data extracted from the interviews. This section outlines 
the categories that emerged from the perspectives of insurance professionals. Divided in five 
categories, this chapter will define cyber insurance, the wording used in policies, the difficulties 
with the lack of data, the necessity of information networks and finally the cyber resiliency that 
this coverage offers.  
The fourth chapter will analyze the categories that emerged from the interviews and draw 
a parallel with the information found in the literature review. The analysis will be based on three 
ways in which the insurance industry acts on cybercrimes. The three means are Understanding 
Cybercrimes, Risk Management and Behavior Towards Risk. Finally, the last part will look at the 
























CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW  
The internet is continuously facilitating how firms conduct their day to day activities. Due to 
the internet, a company can maximize their efficiency, expand their market to a global audience, 
and coordinate employees that are working from different locations. In addition, the internet has 
allowed the development of new business models and services. Examples include online shopping, 
the selling of domain names and the rental of virtual infrastructures, such as cloud computing. As 
business owners shift merge to a virtual infrastructure, they expose themselves to new risks, such 
as cybercrimes, in addition to the traditional liabilities, such as fires, floods and burglary. For this 
reason, cyber insurance is becoming one of the most sought out coverages by business owners 
(Insurance Institute, 2015).  
Theoretically, risk is continuously present in our daily activities. A risk can only be considered 
a risk when we, as a society, identify and perceive certain events as detrimental to our operations 
(Garland, 2003). For this matter, the risk becomes something that needs to be accepted, challenged, 
eliminated or, when possible, mitigated (Elliott, 1960). In fact, insurance is one of the most 
important tools to mitigate the effect of a loss (Riegel, Miller & Williams, 1976). In its most 
simplistic form, risk mitigation through the means of insurance has two aspects. The first is the 
transfer of a risk. This consists of transferring that risk from the insured to the insurer who has the 
financial means to pay the loss (Rejda, 2011). The second is the sharing of losses. This concept 
relates to a group of persons agreeing to pay a certain premium for a common risk they share in 
order to reimburse the one that may suffer the loss (Riegel & al., 1976).  
The previous paragraph offers an overview of the insurance industry services as a risk 
mitigation product. However, their implication within our modern society go well beyond financial 
compensation and risk spreading. Several authors have documented their understanding of 
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insurance. According to Ewald (1991), it’s a model of rationality in which it breaks down, 
rearranges and orders certain elements of reality, which is later formalized through the calculation 
of probabilities. Baker and Simon (2002) believe that beyond spreading risk, insurance takes part 
in different activities. For example, Baker (2003) explains that the classification of risk puts 
forward a vision of individual responsibility and protection. Heimer (2003), suggests that insurers 
are moral actors and through their contracts, political policies and disciplinary mechanisms, will 
influence their client’s behavior. She advances that through these mechanisms, we should seek to 
understand insurers’ behaviors which also make up insurance relationships.  
The first part of this literature review reveals how technologies of insurance calculate, regulate 
and manage the risk, from a social science perspective. This will be done by understanding the 
following sections: Origins and Principles of Insurance, the Insurance and Risk Calculation, 
Insurance as Construction of Social Behaviors Towards Risks, and to conclude, Insurance and 
Governance. 
Following a rather theoretical approach to insurance, the second part will examine a technical 
facet of the cyber insurance market and its various obstacles. This section will comprehensively 
look at E-Perils and how they are interpreted legally by insurance companies. It will continue with 
an analysis of difficulties caused by the absence of data needed to offer competitive cyber 
coverage.  
 
1. Fundamentals of Insurance  
 
1.1. Origins & Principles of Insurance 
 
As explained by Hacking (2003), insurance is an important institution that allows to get a 
better understanding of risk and uncertainty. The researcher argues that insurance is at the core of 
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the evolution of the science of risk and probabilities. Yet, historically this was not always the case. 
Origins of insurance can be traced back to ancient Rome. According to Vance (1908), some 
historians, such as Malynes (1622), found that to encourage the importation of corn, the Roman 
emperor Claudius took on the risk of loss due to potential perils at sea. Similar concepts were also 
identified in Asian countries, such as China and India. Other authors, such as Gandrud (2014) and 
Hellwege (2016), argue that insurance practices, particularly business insurance practices, were 
observed in several other European countries, such as Germany, France and Italy. However, no 
custom insurance contracts are known to have been found from that time in history. For Vance 
(1908), such agreements represented a rather vague and limited definition of insurance. 
Insurance as we know today originated in the 17th century on Lombard street in England 
to protect marine risks, such as the loss of merchandise and the lives of ships’ crew (Hellwege, 
2016). This form of insurance, which was developed by the prominent Lloyd’s of London, took 
on the marine risk by getting an underwriter to “prepare a slip, called a bordereau, that was passed 
from underwriter to underwriter until sufficient names and amounts were attached to cover the full 
risk, at which time the insurance was bound” (Prefer & Klock, 1974, p. 17).  Additionally, the 
Great Fire of London (September 2nd, 1666) also contributed to the development of fire insurance 
(Hellwege, 2016). In 1666, over a quarter of the buildings in London were burned, which prompted 
Nicholas Barbon to design an insurance contract that is still used today; it allowed insurance 
companies to restore or replace the damaged buildings (Prefer & Klock, 1974).  
These cases paved the way to a specialized insurance industry, as known today. Other than 
marine and fire insurance, several products are now offered by the industry to assist a company’s 
risk management efforts. As an example, property and casualty insurance covers incidents 
pertaining to automobiles, burglary and theft. Within this line of insurance, we find commercial 
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insurance: products geared towards businesses, non-profit organizations and government agencies 
(Vaughan and Vaughan, 2003). These products are classified in different categories, such as 
General Liability Insurance (CGL), which is usually a package product that covers basic legal 
liabilities, property damage and bodily injuries; Director and Officers (D&O), which provides 
protection to businesses if they are sued due to their directors’ or officers’ mismanagement of the 
company they serve; equipment breakdown insurance, which covers the accidental breakdown of 
specialized machinery; and Crime Insurance, which covers the loss of money and other property 
due to acts of theft, burglary and other criminal misconduct (Redja, 2011).  
These products, are generally understood as a “social device for eliminating or reducing the 
cost to society of a certain type of risk” (Mowbray, Blanchard and Williams, 1979, p.1). For 
example, it can compensate for financial losses caused by fire, frauds or cybercrime which led to 
legal liabilities, destruction of equipment or the temporary shut down of business operations. 
However, insurance takes on a much larger role than the one defined above. For, Ericson, Doyle 
and Barry (2003), insurance represents an institution of applied knowledge and social necessity. 
The researchers believe that the insurance companies’ understanding, and governance of risk have 
a considerable social implication for the development of preventive measures, compensations for 
losses, social planning and the freedom to take risks. This is achieved through latest knowledge, 
tools and technologies to develop contracts, premiums, and the development of preventive 
measures (Ericson and Doyle, 2004). Interestingly, due to their ability to assess risk, some 
researchers argue that the industry is contributing to the production of risk in parallel. Beck (1992) 
believes that the scientization of risk contributes to the industry’s profits. By defining risks, 
insurance companies can capitalize on this new form of social fear. Furthermore, Beck (1992) 
states the following: “risks can be more than just called forth, prolonged in conformity to sales 
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needs, and in short manipulated. Demands, and thus markets of a completely new type can be 
creating by varying the definition of risk, especially demand for the avoidance of risk, open to 
interpretation, causally designable and infinitely reproducible” (p.56). Similarly, Becker (1992), 
argues that risk is “the probabilities of physical harm due to given technological or other processes. 
Technical experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose bounding premises as a 
priori to risk discourses” (p.3). The following paragraph will study the literature about how 
insurance companies manage risk and, in turn, makes the risk calculable.  
 
1.2. Insurance & Risk Calculation 
 
For Beck (1992), risk is defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities 
induced and introduced by modernization itself. Risks are consequences which relate to the 
threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They are politically reflexive” 
(p.21). Consequently, a systematic way of dealing with risk is insurance. Insurance according to 
Hacking (2003), is a prominent institution that simultaneously facilitates the understanding of risk 
and uncertainty while also contributing to the development of the science of risk and probabilities. 
It is evident that the insurance industry is an institution motivated by capital gains. Heimer (2003), 
advances that insurers are simultaneously financial institutions and risk managers. In fact, 
investments profits deriving from the stock market are much more important than profits that result 
from underwriting the risk (Heimer, 2003). Despite this greater interest in their investment 
portfolio, insurance remains an important tool to mitigate the loss caused by risks. This is done by 
attributing itself the responsibility of quantifying, commodifying moral commitments within 
underwriting practices, preventive security and indemnification (Ewald, 1991). These practices, 
according to Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003) assign insurance companies the responsibility to act 
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on risk and in turn create a social necessity. The researchers continue their argument by stating 
that decisions taken by insurance professionals will have considerable societal implications that 
will influence a business owner’s decision on the operation of his capital, loss prevention 
measures, social planning and freedom to take risks. To do this, “insurance will call upon the latest 
science regarding each risk they are addressing in order to specify the insurance contract conditions 
and premium rates, assess the validity of claimed losses, and organize loss prevention measures. 
Ideally their own actuarial science, converts myriad of risk in the world into insurance technologies 
that spread and compensate losses with fairness and efficiency” (Ericson & al., 2003, p.5).  
 Ewald (1991) believes that the insurance industry will objectify anything that can 
potentially be perceived as a risk. For Beck (1992) and Garland (2003), these practices are 
contributing to determining and legitimizing the risk. In fact, a risk that is not known to be 
manageable is not considered a risk. Garland (2003) adds that “risk is not a first order of things 
existing in the world” (p.52). Instead, the number of risks present within our modern society is 
based on perception and assessment we make on our relationships with certain events that can 
potentially impact our plans, interest or well-being (Garland, 2003). This suggests that risk 
determination by the industry is made possible by mathematical possibilities. These mathematical 
possibilities are referred as actuarial science (Beck, 2003). Traditionally, insurance companies 
write policies based on an accumulation of historical data, referring to the law of large numbers. 
Car insurance, for example, is based on decades of claims made by automotive drivers. The 
premium and the liability coverage for such insurance is based on microdata, containing several 
types of information. For example, the type of vehicle, the driver’s profile and previous claim 
history are all considerations for liability coverage (Raphael & Rice, 2002; Insurance Bureau of 
Canada, 2016). Moreover, insurance is based on the principle of probability. According to 
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Mowbray, Blanchard and Williams (1979), probability refers to the frequency of an outcome to 
occur over a long period, thus being repeatable. Riegel, Miller and Williams (1976) also state that 
when applying the principle of probability, two conditions must be met. The first is that future 
losses coincide with past and present claims. The second, which is of interest for cyber insurance, 
is that there must be enough data (the Law of Large Numbers) to issue coverages. The Law of 
Large Numbers, based on the work of French mathematician Simeon Poisson, states that “as the 
number of trials increases, the proportion of results approaches the underlying probability” 
(Mowbray & al., 1979, p.24). For this matter, the function of insurance is “to combine a larger 
number of risks and thus reduce the degree of risk and hence uncertainty” (Riegel & al., 1976, p. 
19). Consequently, this science evaluates the risk based on predefined insurable events, 
accordingly basing themselves on the concept of probability. Consequently, the insured risk is 
determined based on economic fluctuations and losses from previous claims. Additionally, to 
quantify a risk, insurance firms identify probability distributions through statistical and economic 
expectations (Landsman & Sherris, 2001).  
For Ewald (1991), these practices are used to objectify the risk that will make it a normality. The 
underlying premise is that society will not consider them accidental. Giddens (1990) also proposes 
that insurance products are purchased not only based on actuarial calculation but fear towards 
security. These actuarial fears justify actuarial practices to render the risk “normal”. Moreover, 
based on this actuarial science, it is apparent that insurance professionals are influence the risk 
discourses (Beck, 1992). In fact, the production of risk is achieved as the insurance institutions are 
organizing, managing and controlling activities perceived as compromising (Beck, 1992). 
Furthermore, the research suggests that through their practices, insurance institutions contribute to 
the development of risk classification. 
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 As previously mentioned, the mathematical probabilities are based on the law of large 
numbers which creates a pool of risk. According to Heimer (2003), risk pools are an organization 
of clients based on their aversion to risk. Ideally, these pools are composed of individuals who, 
through the premium, generate lucrative profits for insurers. Similarly, Baker and Simon (2003) 
show that risk pools are used to “seek collective revenues from each policyholder that will cover 
the cost of that person’s probable losses” (p.73). In this regard, insurance companies will seek 
customers who are morally responsible, who will take the necessary precautions to minimize risks 
and who will not submit unjustified claims that could affect the integrity of the pool. After all, the 
goal of the insurance institutions is not simply to provide indemnity for losses. The primary goal 
is to use profits from premium revenues to increase profits from investments.  Hence, a morally 
responsible client, dedicated to preventing cybercrimes, will develop of contingency plans for their 
company and ensure that they meet government regulations. Additionally, the implementation of 
risk management concepts is also perceived as a morally responsible approach (Yang & Lui, 2014; 
Gordon, & al., 2015; Insurance Institute, 2015).   
To reinforce these practices, insurers will often offer their clients deductions on their 
premiums or deductibles. On the other hand, clients who do not adhere to these practices, are 
imposed stringier conditions such as higher deductibles and excluded clauses. For others, there is 
also the possibility that they cannot benefit from any insurance coverage (Heimer, 2003). For 
Baker and Simon (2002), these practices are contributing to the maintenance and assignment of 
social classes. Risk classification will force some to pay more money simply to enter the pool, 
while others will be completely discriminated from entering (Baker & Simon, 2002; Baker, 2003). 
However, this logic is effective for the insurer because it allows them to offer attractive products 
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at a fair price and ensure that their pools are not compromised by individuals who are highly 
exposed to risk (Heimer, 2003).  
 The previous paragraphs explained how the insurance industry turns uncertainty into a 
calculable risk and maintains social classes. Although the techniques can greatly contribute to the 
science of risk, it comes with certain limits. In addition to risk classification, the literature reveals 
that moral hazards and adverse selection are two predominant issues for the insurance industry. 
 
1.3. Insurance :  Constructing Social Behavior  
 
Risk classification contributes to the construction of social behavior. Generally, moral hazards 
and adverse selection are studied as ways the insurer shapes the insured behaviors towards risk. 
However, Heimer (2003), brings forward a compelling argument that the behavior of the insured 
will also shape the practices of the insurer. Building on risk classification, this section will analyze 
issues pertaining to moral hazard and it adverse selection. Both these facets are studied, through a 
criminological perspective, to understand how they influence the insured and insurer. 
To begin, moral hazards refers to the “dishonest tendencies on the part of the insured that may 
induce the person to attempt to defraud the insurance company” (Vaughan & Vaughan, 2003, p. 
5). When the insurer underwrites a policy for a client, he requires the former to put in place or 
maintain an adequate level of security to reduce the possibilities of submitting a claim (Baker, 
2003). For example, Eling and Werner (2016) suggest, based on Biener and his colleagues (2015), 
that companies may adopt optimal cybersecurity protection while being evaluated, but once they 
sign their policy, they will reduce the cost and level of investment in their cyber protection efforts 
(Yang & Lui, 2014; Majuca, & al., 2006). According to Vaughan and Vaughan (2003), risk 
managers can invoke the utility theory. This theory explains that, when a risk manager considers 
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his revenues, he will look at his risk aversion and will decide that reducing his security investment 
cost will result in a greater monetary return (Mowbray & al., 1979). In fact, Chief Information 
Security Officers (CISO) simply ask themselves two common questions before codifying the 
standards within their companies. The first is, how much will the return on investment be? The 
second is, “How, on an empirical cost-benefit basis, do we know when to patch, fix or shut down 
systems and when new vulnerabilities arise”? (Elliot, Massacci & Williams, 2016, p. 82). Ericson 
and Doyle (2003), argue that this approach is influenced by perception rather than adequate 
knowledge on probabilities. The authors, based on Huber and his colleagues (1997) continue to 
argue that risk managers are often not interested in probabilities. This mindset looks to protect 
against certainty rather than the uncertainty itself. For Taylor (1992), in Ericson and Doyle (2003), 
this is the result of risk managers preferring to invest in protection that is conventional to their 
operations. In fact, research showed that organizations will seek coverages for a risk only after it 
occurred. Looking at cybersecurity investments based on the criteria’s cited above, will facilitate 
the allocation of resources. However, applying a cost-benefit analysis to cyber investments can 
potentially result in a backlash for a company. One fundamental problem is that investing in cyber 
security does not result in an immediate cost-benefit. Cyber security is rather a long-term 
investment that will profit a company when the potential losses are limited thanks to an optimal 
level of security (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn & Zhou, 2015). 
To counter this type of behavior the insurance industry will adopt two strategies. The first is to 
shift the responsibility of the risk to the pool of insured by increasing the cost of premiums while 
reducing the coverage (Ericson and Doyle, 2003). This, according to Ericson and Doyle (2003), 
contributes to the risk classification discussed in the previous section, as some individuals will not 
be able to afford any protection whatsoever. In fact, by using this strategy, the insurance industry 
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continues to strengthen social inequalities. These disparities are achieved by “assessing who are 
normal people for inclusion in an insurance risk pool, and who should be de-selected and un-
pooled, insurance technologies create morally based social distinctions, hierarchies, and 
exclusions” (Ericson and Doyle, 2003, p.319).  
In addition to strengthening social inequalities, this first strategy also leads to adverse selection. 
Adverse selection refers to “the tendency of persons with a higher-than average chance of loss to 
seek insurance at standard rates, which if not controlled by underwriting, results in higher than 
expected loss levels” (Rejda, 2011, p. 26). Baker (2003) adds that adverse selection is the result of 
low-risk individuals not adhering to an insurance policy, leaving the insurance pools with 
individuals representing a higher aversion to risk. As it was already argued, the decision to 
purchase an insurance policy is based on a cost benefit-approach whereby business owners 
mitigate the costs of investing in security measures by comparing it to the risk of being infected 
and the total economic loss that an attack could cause to their commercial activities. Using this 
business approach, there is also a possibility that firms will be more likely to reduce their 
investments in IT security infrastructures and opt for insurance coverage only if “the risk premium 
is equal to the expected loss” (Mukhopadhyay & al., 2013, p.23). This form of probability analysis 
is an important component of how the insurance industry regulates its customers' behaviour to deal 
with uncertainties, leading to adverse selection. Riegel, Miller and Williams (1976) believe that 
companies behave in such ways due to two circumstances. The first is that “the elimination of 
unfavorable consequences may cost too much relative to the potential gain” (2).  The second is 
that some companies can also retain the risk (Riegel & al., 1976). Such a situation occurs, 
according to the concepts of risk management, as follows: when “the acceptance is believed to be 
cheaper, the person subject to a risk may decide to accept it” (Riegel & al., 1976, p.9). Moreover, 
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firms that are reluctant to invest in their own security infrastructures are also more likely to transfer 
the risk to insurance companies (Mukhopadhyay & al., 2013).  
Based on this brief example, it is evident that the insurance industry is strongly influencing the 
behavior of their clients. By pooling individuals in categories, insurance professionals are hoping 
to find themselves with morally responsible clients (Baker & Simon, 2003). However, risk 
classification concepts have shown that this is not always true. In fact, insurance companies, will 
transfer the responsibility of the risk to other while increasing the premium cost (Baker & Doyle, 
2003). It is important to note that such a social divide also favors the upper middle class through 
the need to maintain business relationships.  
The second strategy to counter moral hazards and adverse selection is done through 
surveillance. Among the different approaches, legal advisors in the insurance industry will draft a 
contract that stipulates that clients are liable if they do not maintain the level of protection that was 
originally in place. Insurance will also offer monetary incentives, in the form of cost reduction, for 
clients that adopt adequate risk prevention measures (Heimer, 2003). Pal and Hui (2012) also 
suggest that using tools to monitor their clients will encourage the organizations to expose their 
security systems and allow the insurer to give advice on what should be done to increase their 
security. Additionally, if a breach occurs, the insurer will need to analyze the potential losses that 
the company will endure and the customers that are affected by the attack. By doing so, the clients 
will also be notified as the attacked company will need to provide monetary compensation through 
the money they receive from the insurance company (Pal & Hui, 2012). Conversely Drouin (2004) 
suggests that this practice can reduce the status quo on cyberattacks, which refers to companies 
refusing to share that they got breached. As the insurance company must analyze the breach, this 
can contribute to the implementation of viable security protection products since not only can the 
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claim be denied by the insurance provider, but it can also deter customers from using their platform 
for electronic services which do not meet security standards.  
Moreover, this type of activity allows all the stakeholders to “foster reflexive knowledge of 
moral risks useful to all parties in the insurance relationship in the active management of loss 
prevention and responsible choice in risk taking” (Ericson & Doyle, 2003, p.320).  
Despite the benefit of forcing companies to implement certain security measures, this type of 
practice legitimizes the role of the insurer as surveillance agents. Ericson and Doyle (2003), argue 
that insurance risk logics are rooted within technologies of surveillance, quantification and 
classification which allows the objectification of risk. In turn, this allows the insurer to structure 
moral risk through their actuarial practices and probabilities. By following this approach, insurance 
seeks to determine which people are considered, by their definition, good or bad. For example, 
risk management audits refer to the detailed and systematic analysis that determines the needs of 
an organization regarding the risk they face (Vaughan & Vaughan, 2003).  
These tools for Ericson and Doyle (2003b), are used as an alternative to reduce moral risks and 
to “yield more precise knowledge of moral risks and to justify a crackdown on selected 
contributors to them” (p.358). According to Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003), insurance 
institutions are assigned the responsibility to act according to risk. Their practices will strongly 
influence the functioning of capital, loss prevention measures, social planning and freedom to take 
risks. Furthermore, Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003) suggest that it requires their clients to actively 
participate in the self-governance of their own risks. Thus, these surveillance technologies are used 
to manage their population at a distance, similar to law enforcement agencies. To achieve this form 
of governance, insurers use different tools at their disposal such as questionnaires, audits, credit 
checks, data matching and private investigations (Ericson & Doyle, 2003). For O’Malley (1992), 
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in Cauchie and Chantraine (2005), this is what the researcher defines as new prudentialism. New 
prudentialism is a concept that maintains that crime prevention is transferred from collective risk 
management to individual management of risk. (Cauchie & Chantraine, 2005). However, in this 
new way of preventing risk, individuals will once again rely on the cost-benefit and consequences 
of their actions, which will entail moral hazards. By demanding their clients to be the managers of 
their own risk, the insurance industry is consequently maintaining the presence of moral hazards. 
In fact, this can be understood, as Heimer (2003) describes it, as an incentive for clients to cheat. 
Heimer (2003) argues that insurers impose strict conditions on their clients, but as the risk arises, 
claimants do not receive the payments they think they are entitled to. It is therefore possible that 
the insured may not comply with the insurers' requirements. 
The research supports that the insurance industry acts as preventive risk managers through 
indirect discipline of their clients by taking adequate measures to secure their assets. While this 
surveillance is used to achieve an acceptable loss ratio and to reduce moral hazard, it is important 
to note that the insurance industry plays an active role in managing the safety and security of our 
companies. In fact, this role is legitimized by government agencies. Thus, the next section will 
examine the ways in which private insurance practices extend to the role of government. 
 
1.4. Insurance and Governance 
 
Risk classification and the requirement for companies to incorporate security measures are all 
ways in which the insurer regulates the insured and his behaviour. (Baker, 2003; Heimer, 2003). 
In this section, we will examine how government-like practices are legitimized and transferred to 
insurers as they assume legislators' responsibilities. 
Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003) argue that modernization demands the industry to be 
increasingly involved in risk management. It is thought that a liberal risk regime is emerging. This 
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regime asks private corporations and individuals alike to semi-autonomously take the necessary 
steps to protect against risk (Ericson & al., 2003). Thus, “the state is entwined with the private 
insurance industry, helping to form the economic, social, legal cultural and political aspect of 
insurance as governance” (Ericson & al., 2003, p.7). In addition, the government also regulates the 
industry and its social justice technology function by ensuring that risk pooling techniques are fair, 
policies are sold at a just price and claims are compensated. Meanwhile, the insurance industry 
invests heavily in bonds and government securities while offsetting losses that might otherwise 
have been the burden of the state (Ericson & al., 2003).  
In addition to these financial implications, the state has the responsibility to oversee the 
security of their citizens. With the constant evolution of our society, Beck (1992), argues that social 
control cannot be solely the burden of the state. He argues that this is because the dissemination 
of knowledge about modern risks is not limited to government officials. As noted earlier, risk is 
simply the accumulation of knowledge about a hazard that was previously unknown to society 
(Ericson & Doyle, 2002). Through actuarial processes and forcing policyholders to increase their 
security standards, the insurance industry is helping the government to manage the “everyday 
world of safety and security” (Ericson & Doyle, 2002, p.4). Governments and the insurance 
industry must work in partnership to develop new insurance markets and risk markets that neither 
insurance nor government can monitor on their own. (Ericson & al., 2003). For Heimer (2002), 
this is an important component of the insurance industry and its relationship with government as 
it provides a strong support to enforce law and regulation. For the most part, insurance will regulate 
certain activities that the state cannot necessarily enforce (Heimer, 2002).  For example, in property 
insurance, the state requires drivers to purchase insurance before operating a vehicle. Hence, the 
insurer, through underwriting and actuarial practices, will draft policies that enforce a norm and 
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expected behavior of the driver (Baker & Simon, 2002). This example shows how the insurance 
industry becomes a regulator, since their private legislation is legally binding, as is the government 
legislator. (O’Malley, 1991). Baker and Simon (2001) also agree with this idea that the insurer is 
amongst one of the most prominent sources of regulatory authority.  
This regulatory authority is also determined by the way the insurers discipline their clients. In 
general, governments are tasked, through law enforcement agencies to enact laws and maintain 
social order (Baker, 2002). This responsibility is, to some extent, transposed to the insurer. Ewald 
(1991), considers insurance as a moral technology where their risk appraisal disciplines society.  
He argues that insurance, as opposed to governments bring a different approach to justice. Rather 
than the idea of cause, insurance is distributing the risk burden to a collective that will decide to 
abide from determined rules (Ewald, 1991). Similarly, Baker (2002), argues that for insurance to 
be successful as a risk management tool, it must be a social responsibility. The researcher continues 
the literature by stating that, in general, when the product is purchased, the client feels that his 
responsibility for risk is decreased. However, this should not be the case. Baker (2002), suggests 
that for insurance to work, policyholders must abide to contract rules.  
Heimer (2003), on the other hand, argues that insurers, as risk managers, are the regulators of 
behaviour while simultaneously spreading risk. The researcher continues to argue that this 
disciplinary process is consistent with Foucault's (1977) idea that there is a process where 
discipline is now displaced with punishment. The process favors a reduction of social and financial 
cost while spreading discipline measures in different private and public institutions. Similarly, it 
seems that insurance can be considered as a component of the new penology, a concept theorized 
by Feeley and Simon (1992) (Cauchie & Chantraine, 2005).  These scholars, believe that neo-
liberalism, which fosters a collective morality, are relinquishing the use of punitive disciplinary 
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measures. These punitive measures are being substituted by managerial goals which encourage “a 
safeguarding continuum, which is to say a series of resources to be allocated in according to the 
degree of control required by the risk profile of penalized individuals, but also in accordance with 
their cost” (Brion, 2001 in Cauchie & Chantraine, 2005, p.6). Additionally, Heimer (2003) believes 
that the insurance industry contributes to this disciplinary on three different levels. The first, is by 
instructing clients to adopt risk reduction practices.  Second, it is by pushing through regulations 
that are enforced by financial means. Finally, the insurer uses actuarial techniques to forecast and 
indemnify accident and deviant behaviors which will reduce the “social cost of non-normative 
behavior” (Heimer, 2003, p.285). By imposing these three steps, insurance companies make “the 
punishment, control or reshaping of abnormal or unacceptable behaviour less necessary” (Heimer, 
2003, p.285). 
 
2. The Cyber Insurance Market & its Obstacles  
 
It has been determined that the modern insurance industry has a considerable impact in shaping 
the social behaviours of their clients and becoming an alternative to risk governance. This section 
will review the challenges insurers encounter when they are trying to commodify cybercrimes. 
This will be done by studying E-Perils, Legal Framework and Insurance, and the Absence of Data 
and Actuarial Modelling.  
 
2.1. E-Perils, Legal Framework & Insurance 
 
One of the main differences that is observed with cyber insurance when compared to others 
is the insured good. Within this professional practice, considerable debates have emerged 
regarding the insurability of virtual data. This is because cybercrimes fit with standard losses 
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observed in other claims. Cyberattacks are relatable to business interruption, additional 
expenditures, the loss of profits and the cost of hardware replacement (Elliott, 1960). As an 
example, a company that conducts their commercial activities on the web will not necessarily get 
their product physically stolen or their office and/or storefront damaged. However, they could very 
well be victims of a cyberattack, which could damage the infrastructure facilitating the business 
operations and allow for data to be stolen.  
As security threats are evolving at a rapid pace, companies are unable to entirely secure 
their cyber infrastructures despite the considerable amount of money allocated to cybersecurity. In 
fact, firms have traditionally relied on antiviruses and antispam software, firewalls and several 
other tools to secure their electronic data (Pal & Hui, 2012). However, Statistics Canada reported 
in 2016 that 23996 cyber-related violations were reported to Canadian police services. 
Additionally, PricewaterhouseCooper (PWC) (2017) reported that 46% of economical frauds in 
Canada were linked to cybercrimes. The techniques frequently used by the attackers were phishing 
emails (58%) and Malware, short for malicious software (45%). Similarly, in its 2017 data breach 
report, Verizon (2017) found that, on a sample of 65 organizations breached, over half experienced 
some form of hack that included the use of malware and malicious emails (also called phishing 
tools). Yet, several insurance companies are finding it difficult to protect against such losses as 
definitions regulating insurance practices have omitted cyber losses (Gordon & al., 2003). This 
complexity lies with the uncertainty concept found under the risk theory that characterizes the field 
of insurance. Thus, as the previously mentioned studies indicate, cyberattacks are a recognizable 
crime but they are perpetrated through different technical means, which make it hard for insurance 
companies to appraise the loss (Pal & Hui, 2012). Therefore, leading to uncertainty when drafting 
new policies. Understanding uncertainty faced by cyber insurance, it is necessary to uncover 
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insurance practices, legal practices and legal vocabulary used in drafting policies. After all, 
insurance companies develop their products in light of the reality of cyberattacks. 
E-businesses have emerged through the development of the internet. Nonetheless, 
traditional firms have also migrated to a form of e-business. From online shopping, online banking 
and cloud computing, the presence of businesses in the virtual world has become standard causing 
stirring debate in the insurance industry as to how to accommodate services.  After all, insurance 
companies, through a first-party risk or a third-party risk, offer physical damage coverage policies 
to tangible properties but not to intangible properties. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail (2003), as well as 
Shakelford (2012), all reach a consensus on how to classify cybercrimes. Both research groups 
agree that first-party risk occurs when there is a loss of profit in line with theft, the trade of secrets 
or extortion made by hackers. On the other hand, third-party risks are related to damages that are 
caused to another company by forwarding a computer virus; the inability to provide a service due 
to cybercriminals stopping the firm’s activities; or the theft of credit card information by a third 
party (Gordon & al., 2003; Shakelford, 2012).  However, with different types of business activities 
taking place virtually, insurance companies are left uncertain whether cyber breaches are 
considered tangible or intangible (Yu, 2014). According to one author, this ambiguity is caused by 
the CGL, under which tangible goods are considered physical and are related to property damage. 
Many computer-based storage facilities and other cyber coverage are, thus, excluded since, 
“electronic data is not a tangible property” (Yu, 2014, p. 240).  
The word tangible is a major concern when drafting insurance policies (Majuca & al., 
2006). As previously stated, the wording of insurance policies became a major factor in deciding 
if virtual data can be considered tangible property. To circumvent court decisions and offer their 
clients adequate protection, insurance firms have decided to modify their policy vocabulary 
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(Willis, 2010). For Eling and Werner (2016), this can be done in two distinct ways. The first is by 
modifying the policies and explicitly excluding cyber losses therefrom. The other is to include 
them in traditional policies but adjust the premium accordingly. Nonetheless, this approach is not 
feasible not only because of the CGL but also due to the Insurance Service Office. The Insurance 
Service Office, an American company offering insurance information and analytics to a global 
market, takes a limited approach in what it defines as a tangible property. In fact, within their 
guidelines, they clearly highlight that electronic data is not a tangible property as it is simply 
information that is stored on various technological equipment, such as computers, software and 
drivers (Yu, 2014). 
 
2.2. The Absence of Data  
 
A serious problem for the insurance industry is the lack of data on cybercrimes required to 
develop competitive policies. We know that actuarial calculations are based on historical data, like 
a common product such as automobile insurance, which represented 42.2% of claims written in 
2015. In addition, net claims made by policyholders amounted to more than $15 billion (Insurance 
Bureau of Canada, 2016). These figures clearly show how the ability to develop car insurance 
policies is based on available data. This availability is lacking in the cyber insurance landscape. 
Historical data is important as it allows the insurer to evaluate the possibilities of an eventual 
risk. Such practice is not facilitated within the cyber insurance market in Canada as opposed to the 
American market (Insurance Institute, 2015). This can be explained by the United-States’ legal 
approach to cyberattacks and adverse selection. The cyber insurance market is much more 
developed in the USA. This is in part due to proactive measures taken by their government. As 
previously mentioned, in 2002, the American government enacted several laws that require 
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companies, when they are breached, to notify the public and their clients. These laws have 
significantly increased cyber security awareness and the demand for cyber insurance (Eling & 
Werner, 2016). It can also be assumed that a similar trend will be observed in Europe, since the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have adopted the Directive on 
Security of Network and Information Systems. These directives, which should be standard across 
the European member states’ laws by 2018, will demand that several industries, such as transport, 
water, banking, financial market and healthcare systems, “take appropriate security measures and 
… notify serious incidents to the relevant national authority” (European Union, 2016). Yet, this 
active participation is absent within the Canadian legal framework. In fact, the Insurance Institute 
(2015) suggests that the Canadian government may want to expand their role within their Cyber 
Security Strategy. This would enable the insurance market to acquire additional data regarding 
cyber incidents making the drafting of policies plausible. Additionally, insurance firms and the 
government can venture into a partnership that allows for the promotion of cyber security by 
favouring a preventive and resilient approach (Insurance Institute, 2015). Indeed, it can be argued 
that if the government forces companies to divulge their cyber incidents, it can allow insurance 
companies to accumulate a considerable amount of data. In turn, with the vast data accumulated, 
insurance firms can assist the government in developing a stronger cyber security policy and 
enhance cyber security tools to prevent any further attacks that can compromise the nation’s 
classified information.   
 With the continuous transfer to digital services, many businesses are seeking to purchase 
coverage that will protect them against corporate espionage, attacks that compromise their 
operating systems or that keep their files hostage (Insurance Institute, 2015). However, most cyber 
insurance policies available to the Canadian market do not fully cover these losses (Eling & 
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Werner, 2016). The lack of legal constraints to force companies to divulge their breaches is also a 
primary factor in the slow development of cyber insurance; it is suggested that, due to the lack of 
reporting, insurance firms do not possess adequate knowledge and large numbers to anticipate 
losses (Gordon & al., 2003).  In turn, this forces insurance companies to set a price on 
unquantifiable data, which does not necessarily represent the actuarial value, and which leads to 
the principle of adverse selection (Gordon & al., 2003). 
Several researchers have suggested that it would be wise for companies to expose their 
breaches to the public. One of the main purposes is to avoid information asymmetry which then 
leads to an adverse selection. (Biener, & al., 2016; Eling & Werner, 2016). Regarding cyber 
insurance, information asymmetry arises when clients that seek out cyber insurance policies have 
already been breached and are withholding that information from their insurer (Gordon & al., 
2003; Eling & Werner, 2016). However, as there are not any standard cyber breach measurements 
developed within the field, insurance firms are unaware if their client’s digital infrastructure is 
considered a high or a low risk in terms of losses (Majuca & al., 2006). 
The adverse selection contributes to another consistent problem faced by cyber insurance 
which also leads to a lack of data. In general, when estimating the loss created by a cybercrime, 
insurers tend to focus their study on short term direct losses (Insurance Institute, 2015). Yet, it is 
suggested that before a company learns that they have been attacked several months can go by 
(Insurance Institute, 2015). In fact, a study by the Ponemon Institute (2015) found that it can take 
a company up to 170 days to discover an attack, and if an attack is conducted by an insider, this 
can take over a year to discover. Moreover, since estimating the cost of a cyber attack is often 
based on short term losses, insurance companies often fail to predict or analyze future impacts of 
the attack, which goes against the principle of probability. As an example, quantifying the loss of 
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a laptop is easy to assess, but it can be difficult to estimate the value of data found in the laptop, 
which may or may not be compromised or which may be revealed only at a later time (Insurance 
Institute, 2015). Thus, depending on the frequency, severity and value of the loss, the costs that 
are considered usually account for crisis management, the income lost during the business 
interruption, and negotiations to pay their customers or extortion fees (Insurance Institute, 2015). 
This again causes insurance firms to limit their policies and offer a general coverage that only 
covers certain aspects of attack, such as legal defenses, forensics and notification services if the 
law requires it (NetDiligence, 2016). However, Majuca and his associates (2006) noted that, if 
organizations are more likely to divulge their information, this will allow insurance companies to 
reduce their premiums and offer coverages that respond to the losses created by a cyberattack. 
 
2.3. Actuarial Modelling 
 
Insurance is predominantly based on actuarial science and statistical and economic 
expectations. However, as previously mentioned, the Canadian legal framework and the lack of 
data do not facilitate these actuarial techniques. In fact, Eling and Werner (2016) refer to the Law 
of Large Numbers when they suggest that “the quality of available data also limits the 
improvements that can be made in modelling. Especially for insurance purposes, the number of 
data breaches is not sufficient to calculate premiums, capital or reserves” (p.478). To circumvent 
these limits, Walsh (2001) and Majuca, Yurcik and Kesan (2006) suggest that it is necessary for 
Risk-metrics to be developed to facilitate the estimation of a risk. To this end, different approaches 
have been suggested by authors, such as a Semantic Cyber Incident Classification (SCIC) model, 
a Monopolistic Cyber Risk Probability Measure, a Model of Self-Protection and Utility Based 
Preferential Pricing (UBPP).  
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 For Elnagdy, Qiu and Gai (2016), cyber insurance represents an effective tool that serves 
the financial industry to reduce potential cyber risks. Nonetheless, they argue that the lack of data 
and poorly developed actuarial frameworks can cause an insurance firm to endure important 
financial losses and make costly actuarial mistakes. If such a scenario presents itself, it would be 
unreasonable for insurance companies to offer protection against cyberattacks as the objectives of 
an insurance company are to make their business profitable, compete with other firms and pay 
claims as they happen (Rejda, 2011). To prevent such failures, Elnagdy, Qiu and Gai (2016) 
suggest adopting a SCIC model. This model requires actuaries to proceed with an ontological 
approach consisting of three phases. The first is to understand technical rules and regulations as 
well as restrictions regarding cyber incidents. The second phase requires the use of ontological 
definitions that can be observed in phase one. Finally, the third phase involves linking the previous 
two steps and identifying the different relationships that can potentially lead to a cyberattack 
(Elnagdy, Qiu & al., 2016). Similarly, Pal and Hui (2012) suggest a Monopolistic Cyber Insurance 
Model. This model requires each client seeking to invest in cyber insurance to adhere to a 
determined level of security standards. Following the implementation of these standards, insurance 
firms assess these measures as well as the location, externalities and quality of the data to develop 
a policy. Additionally, the insurance firms allocate rebates or fines in their client’s premiums if 
they did or did not maintain the established level of network security (Pal & Hui, 2012).  
 As opposed to the SCIC and the Monopolistic cyber insurance model, Landsman and 
Sherris (2001) suggest a model that does not require companies to invest in additional cyber 
protection. Their model bases itself on statistical and economic assumptions. The researchers 
consider that individuals are risk averse. Financially speaking, a risk averse individual is, for 
example, an investor who would rather make a low than a high return while minimizing the risks 
28 
 
associated with their investment (www.investopedia.com). Thus, to determine a premium for a 
cyber risk, it would be necessary to financially convert probability distributions and random future 
gains or losses. This would allow insurance firms to set a premium based on certain observed 
behaviors in the fields of insurance and financial markets (Landsman & Sherris, 2001). However, 
Bolot and Lelarge (2008) believe that only relying on risk aversion is less attractive to insurance 
firms. This is because when a cyber breach occurs, it is most likely that it will be correlated with 
other forms of risk. Additionally, by exclusively relying on risk aversion, insurance firms will omit 
analyses of the potential risks faced by others (Bolot & Lelarge, 2008). 
 To counter the correlated losses that can be faced by others, Mukhopadhyay and his 
colleagues (2013) propose a UBPP model. This concept is based on the belief that each 
organization has its own risk profile. Thus, when calculating the premium and analyzing the risk, 
four distinct categories are taken into consideration. These categories are the following; the 
probability of a malicious event, online revenues generated by the organization, and the utility 
expected from the insured and uninsured customer (Mukhopadhyay & al., 2013). Based on this 
model, the researchers believe that when analyzing all the variables present in an organization 
seeking cyber insurance, insurance firms can provide attractive premiums as a guarantee that the 
payments will be made in case of an attack (Mukhopadhyay & al., 2013).  
 Some (e.g. Bohme and Schwartz (2010)), moreover, suggest a framework that unifies all 
the approaches previously mentioned. This framework bases its modelling decisions on five 
specific factors: the network environment, the demand side, the supply side, the information 
structure and the organizational environment (Bohme & Schwartz, 2010). The researchers believe 
that this modelling framework would allow for a better comprehension of cyber risks. In fact, cyber 
risk models cannot differentiate themselves only through a demand supply approach but, rather, 
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require a global understanding of cyber networks, information and security standards established 
by their clients. Additionally, standard information, such as the time and place of an attack 
potentially taking place, are considered relevant information (Bohme & Schwartz, 2010). 
 Although these frameworks seem to have a certain appeal to insurance firms, they have 
several limits. A major one, which is also highlighted by Bohme and Schwartz (2010), is that there 
was no quantitative data and a lack of correspondence to the probabilities rules. That is, the 
proposed models were not tested with concrete data but rather test scenarios. The mathematical 
formulas employed in the calculations of a premium are simply hypotheses made by the 
researchers. This being the case, it seems rather unlikely that insurance companies would adopt a 
modelling approach without it being tested on concrete evidence as this can generate considerable 
uncertainty and losses for the insurance firm if the risk is not properly assessed. Moreover, Garland 
(2003) argues that the validity of risk assessment tools depends on previous categorization systems 
and metrics. Yet, with cyber insurance being a new product it seems difficult to apply such 
actuarial models. Other than the lack of data, these modelling approaches heavily rely on the work 
of different actors. As an example, the different models that are being proposed suggest that an 
audit should be made before a premium can be calculated. The audit is administered by insurers, 
analyzes the company’s security parameters and requires them to meet certain standards which are 
defined by Rejda (2011) as pre-loss objectives. These are recommendations made to companies 
which require them to deploy adequate cyber security solutions within their organizations. These 
solutions include the development of contingency plans and insuring that the companies meet 
governmental regulations. Implementing these risk management concepts can also be an advantage 
for companies as they can possibly benefit from a discount on their premium (Yang & Lui, 2014; 




3. Limits & Context  
 
The literature outlines how the insurance industry acts as a risk management tool and the 
social implications of their practices. Insurance research is typically geared towards legal and 
economic studies. However, it is an integral part of social science and an important locus of 
research for the sociology of institutions. It should be noted that insurance governs other 
institutions, including the state, due to its power of collecting and diffusing risk. According to 
Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003), “the insurance institution is a hub and repository of the risk 
communication systems of other institutions in defining, production, taking and managing risks” 
(p.9). Ericson and Doyle (2004) argue that for the insurance industry anything is insurable as long 
as it falls within the principles of insurability regardless if new risks are brought by the 
modernization of technologies. It is important to note that the literature was based on traditional 
products such as life, general and property insurance. To understand how Canadian insurance 
companies conceptualize cyber risks to quantify a residual or evolving loss, we will bring a new 
understanding on the techniques used to underwrite cybercrimes, define cyber risk, produce 
knowledge on risk and the management tools that the insurance industry develops for this new 
form of risk. 
The literature also showed that insurance institutions, through their techniques of defining, 
producing and managing the risk, create market pools and produce risk. These pools create 
classifications that maintain social inequalities (Ericson and Doyle, 2003).  On the other hand, 
insurers are also becoming effective risk managers by preventing the spreading of risk. Hence, it 
is argued that the “private insurance industry helps shape the contour of risk society as we well as 
the problems faced by that society” (Ericson & al., 2003). For this matter, by interviewing 
insurance professionals operating in the field of cyber coverage, the research will address the limits 
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of the scientific knowledge on cybercrime developed by Canadian insurance institutions as well 
as how they operate within the boundaries of these limits. This will bring added value to the 
sociology of risk and a better understanding of the role private industries play in helping 
government agencies and organizations to manage cyber risk. 
 
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY 
Following these limits, the goal of this thesis is to understand how insurance companies 
conceptualize cyber risks in order to quantify a residual or evolving loss. This topic is particularly 
relevant as it will enable an in-depth understanding as to how insurance companies interpret 
cybercrime and will also provide a better understanding as to how the little data available to them 
is quantified in order to act as an add on to risk governance. The following chapter will be 
dedicated to the methodology used within this research, namely, a qualitative approach based on 
the Grounded Theory methods and techniques developed by Glasser and Strauss (1967).  
The first part of this section will focus on methodological choices and how they relate to 
the research objectives. Additionally, this chapter will cover the data collection which 
encompasses semi-structured Interviews and Theoretical Sampling. Finally, the chapter will 
conclude with the techniques used to facilitate the data analysis.  
 
1. Methodological Choices 
 
1.1. The Qualitative Approach & Grounded Theory 
 
Throughout this study, a qualitative approach was preferred as the goal is to better 
understand how professionals in the field of insurance conceptualize cyber risks. As opposed to 
quantitative methods, the qualitative approach allows for research participants to better define 
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“what is central and important in their experience” (Van Den Hoonard, 2012, p. 2). Similarly, 
qualitative research will enable the exploration of a field filled of studies where little is known 
about the subject (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Additionally, qualitative methods are designed to 
develop an understanding that emerges from interactions between individuals and the meaning 
they assign to certain factors or events, which in turn leads to the development of a theory (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998; Van Den Hoonard, 2012). This is considerably different from quantitative 
methods as those who use the quantitative approach usually begin with a theory and then conduct 
empirical tests to verify the validity of such theory (Van Den Hoonard, 2012). Hence, as previously 
mentioned, the relatively new state of cyber insurance requires the employment of a qualitative 
approach as barely any data or research is available. Thus, interacting with insurance professionals 
will facilitate how the former conceptualize cyber insurance. 
 To facilitate the development of such theory, Grounded Theory (GT) approach, designed 
by Glasser and Strauss (1967), will be employed as the methodology behind the research. Despite 
the fact that some, such as Loubster (1968), believe that such an approach is considerably 
inductive, GT is ideal to analyze cyber insurance as it facilitates the development of theories that 
can be pertinent to both political and practical analysis (Charmaz, 2014). In fact, GT is far from 
being inductive; it requires the researcher to start researching without any preconceived theories. 
Individuals that choose to employ such a qualitative method must continuously gather data and 
conduct thorough analysis throughout the research process (Creswell, 1998; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). This methodological choice allowed us to understand what is happening within the 
governance of cyber risk through insurance (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Additionally, according 
to Strauss and Corbin (1998), the use of creativity in developing a theory will force the researchers 
to “aptly name categories, ask stimulating questions, make comparisons, and extract an innovative, 
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integrated, realistic scheme for masses of unorganized raw data” (13). Hence, this will allow for 
the study to resemble with more accuracy the phenomenon that is being observed, which in this 
case is cyber insurance. In fact, according to Glasser and Strauss in their book The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory (1967), GT allows for systematic and rigorous research procedures that will 
facilitate the development of conceptual categories. 
 
1.2. Sampling Method 
 
At the core of our sampling method, Theoretical Sampling was used in order to satisfy the 
requirements of Grounded Theory. Theoretical Sampling refers to the process of gathering 
participants, which will allow one to maximize the information available, and find categories and 
concepts to facilitate the development of a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This approach entails 
that, going forward with interviews, participants are selected not based on a predefined population 
but by the emergence of theoretical ideas (Walsh, Bailyn, Fernandez & Glaser, 2015). However, 
this does not mean that the initial participants will be picked randomly. 
 For the first part of the selection process, Theoretical Sampling requires researchers to set 
initial considerations to fit the purpose of the study. The first consideration is to select the group 
that will be studied. This is directly based on the research question and the field of study. The 
second consideration requires the researcher to decide what type of data will be used to conduct 
the research. The choice of data, such as observations, interviews, biographies etc., depends on 
what is more beneficial to the research. The third consideration requires the researcher to decide 
how long a field should be studied and if he or she must modify that field as the research 
progresses. This also depends on data saturation. Finally, the researchers need to consider the 
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amount of data needed for the study. However, this consideration will be modified as the theory 
being developed evolves (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
 Based on the preceding considerations, several criteria were decided for the benefit of the 
research. The first criterion required that all the participants be working within the Canadian 
insurance market, since the research is based within Canada. Thus, the participants needed to hold 
different roles within the field of insurance, such as brokers, underwriters, lawyers, claim adjusters, 
actuaries and customer service representatives. There was no criteria as to the company they 
worked for. This research tried to get insightful data from professionals who work within different 
companies whether they are big insurance companies or small local brokerage cabinets. Although 
individuals had to be working in the insurance market, it was essential that they also possessed an 
expertise of cyber insurance. This selection was quite difficult as not many professionals 
specialised in this form of insurance. To facilitate the selection process, several organizations, such 
as the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC) and the Autorité des Marché Financiers (AMF), were 
contacted to see if they could assist us in finding participants. However, due to the specific nature 
of the research and their organizational roles, they were not able to help. Thus, LinkedIn became 
the primary resource to search for participants. Within the social networking website, several 
filters, such as locations, title, position, interest, field of expertise and company, were selected. As 
an example, in one general query, Canada was the location, Cyber Insurance was the industry and 
Underwriter was the position. By this approach, we found 41 professionals who fit the profile of 
the research. However, LinkedIn was not the only tool used to search for cyber insurance 
professionals. Certain publications that were analyzed contained contact information for 
professionals working within the subject of research. These publications came from the Canadian 
Underwriter as well as company-based publications found on their corporate websites. These 
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included companies such as Marsh, Northbridge, Zurich, AIG and Chubb. Out of these 
publications, 7 professionals were identified but only 2 accepted to participate.  
Once the interviews started, the second part required by GT and facilitated by Theoretical 
Sampling came into effect. This approach entailed that interview participants were not selected 
based on a predefined population but by the emergence of theoretical ideas (Walsh & al., 2015). 
This was possible due to the fact that, as we progressed in the interviews and analyzed the data, 
comparing and contrasting had to continually be done in order to develop emerging categories. 
Additionally, the idea behind this approach was to “confirm or disconfirm the conditions, both 
contextual and intervening, under which the model holds” (Creswell, 1998, p. 119). By using such 
a framework, the sampling ended once the research was saturated (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Saturation is defined as when one researches to the point where collecting new data is counter 
productive, not adding anything relevant, or when the researcher runs out of time, money or both 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
 
1.3. Semi Structured Interviews  
 
To stay true to GT, semi-structured interviews were used to conduct this research and gather 
the data required for the development of a theory. According to Creswell (1998), when using GT 
as the methodological approach, one must conduct several visits to the field. Although the 
methodology does not require any standard qualitative combination of procedures in regards to 
data collection, it is important for a researcher to continuously analyze the data that is being 
collected. In fact, the use of a GT approach implies that researchers must follow a zig-zag process. 
This process requires the interviewers to go out into the field to “gather information, analyze the 
data, back to the field to gather more information, analyze the data and so forth” (Creswell, 1998; 
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57). Hence, these interviews were conducted while simultaneously coding, categorizing and 
analyzing the data that was being collected. However, to insure the fluidity of this section, the 
coding and analysis steps will be presented in the following paragraphs. The process of 
interviewing stopped only once the data collected was saturated.  
 Based on the interviewing requirements while using GT, semi-structured interviewing was 
selected as it allowed the interviewee freedom with respect to the information they provided 
(Poupart, 1997). In particular, it allowed the participant to fully and freely express his or her 
knowledge about cyber insurance, which is what the methodological framework requires (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2009). Of course, the interview did have a script; however, it was developed not to 
force the participant to answer predisposed questions but to offer structure. In fact, the script had 
certain guidelines with suggested questions, but the way they were asked depended on the answers 
given by the participant and potential new directions created thereby. Thus, this interviewing 
technique facilitated the GT requirement that the interviewee have freedom given that his answers 
reflect the actual social setting as he understands it, which could differ among participants 
(Suddaby, 2006).  
 
2. Field Work 
 
2.1. The Participants  
 
Ideally, Grounded Theory requires 20 to 30 participants as such allows for the saturation 
of data. However, due to the relatively new product of cyber insurance, the lack of professionals 
specialising in the field in Canada, the non-response rate, and time constraints, the sample size was 
limited. Based on the criteria dictated by Theoretical Sampling, the population for this study 
consisted of 10 professionals from different Canadian cities such as Toronto, Hamilton, Montreal, 
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Vancouver and Calgary occupying different roles in the field of cyber insurance. These roles 
include underwriters (4), lawyers (1), insurance brokers (4) and claim adjusters (1).  
Having insurance actors of different backgrounds is necessary for this research. In fact, it 
is believed that insurance is a complex organization where the interest of different actors come 
into play (Heimer, 2003). Heimer (2003), argues that an insurance broker can push for sales of 
policies to benefit from a monetary incentive. On the other hand, underwriters can refuse a client 
as he presents himself as a considerable liability for the insurance pool (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). 
Thus, this research will bring a better understanding of what is conceptualized as a cybercrime by 
professionals operating in the same field but occupying different positions. Although this is a small 
sample size, the validity of the data should not be dismissed. For one, most studies conducted 
within the field of insurance are geared towards legal and economic research, leaving the study of 
insurance under a social science perspective scarce (Beck, 1992; Ericson & al., 2003). In addition, 
the social science research consulted in the literature review focused on more traditional insurance 
products, with minimal reference to cyber policies. Of course, this is explained by the fact that 
cyber insurance is a relatively new product on the market and its study was not relevant to scholars 
at the time. Thus, this sample size can be precursor for researchers who wish to continue 
understanding of cybercrimes and cyber insurance from a social science perspective.  
That being said, to get a general understanding of cyber insurance, no preferences were 
given to the type of company they worked for. Participants worked for internationally recognized 
insurance companies to small brokerage firms. Additionally, one worked for an independent legal 
cabinet and another for a claim adjusting company located in Montreal, Quebec. However, no 
information can be shared regarding the name of the participant and his company. The participants 
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requested that their information remain anonymous. For a detailed description of each participant, 
please refer to Table 1 p.42.  
Once the contact information of potential participants was obtained, an initial email explaining 
the research goal and asking if they were interested in participating was sent. Additionally, a 
second email was sent if someone did not respond. The response rate was low; we were only able 
to interview 10 out of the 48 professionals that were contacted. Although this number does not 
reflect the standards required by GT, the rules of Theoretical Sampling were followed. In fact, 
during the LinkedIn research, the initial search was made through a Convenience sampling, which 
is used to find individuals within the field that are likely willing to participate in the study (Bryant 
& Charmaz, 2007). This first part allowed us to interview three individuals: an underwriter, an 
insurance broker and a claim adjuster. As the research progressed, and the data was being analyzed, 
basic themes were emerging from the conducted interviews. This allowed us to guide the search 
in order to find additional professionals who could contribute to the research. Hence, more 
underwriters, brokers and claim adjusters were found along with two lawyers. The lawyers were 
necessary as they explained the legal framework that surrounds insurance and cyber insurance.  
Nonetheless, the research would have also benefited from participants with other roles, such as 
call center agents, actuaries, analysts and loss prevention agents. Such persons could have brought 
additional value to the research as they have diverse responsibilities and play different roles within 
the market. For example, a loss prevention agent would most likely not use the same tools to 






Role: Underwriter Gender: Male Age: Unknown 
Location: Toronto, Ontario Type of Company: International Insurance Company  
Expertise: - Underwriting Directors and Officers (D&O); 
- Professional Liability Insurance;  
- Privacy Liability (Cyber Resource); 
- Providing Insurance solutions for cyber and privacy needs. 
Participant 2 
Role: Senior Underwriter Gender: Male Age: Unknown 
Location: Toronto, Ontario/Boston, Massachusetts  Type of Company: International Insurance Company  
Expertise: - Errors & Omissions (E&O); 
- Security and Privacy; 
- Promoting his respective companies’ E&O offers in Canada; 
- Creation of Cyber insurance business strategy. 
Participant 3 
Role: Broker Gender: Female Age: 32 
Location: Vancouver, British-Columbia Type of Company: Insurance Brokerage Cabinet 
Expertise: - Commercial Insurance and Risk Management 
- Marketing new business in professional liability (E&O), technology insurance, small business 
insurance and trucking insurance; 
- Research Managing general agents (MGA). 
Participant 4 
Role: Lawyer Gender: Female Age: Unknown 
Location: Toronto, Ontario Type of Company: Private Law Firm 
Expertise: - Fidelity Insurance cases; 
- Commercial insurance cases; 
o Professional Liability claims; 
o CGL; 





Role: Broker Gender: Male Age: 32 
Location: Hamilton, Ontario Type of Company: Insurance Brokerage Cabinet 
Expertise: - Professional Insurance and Risk Management Service; 
- Cyber Liability Expert; 
- Insurance Brokerage Services. 
Participant 6 
Role: Claim Adjuster Gender: Male Age: Unknown 
Location: Montreal, Quebec Type of Company: Claim Resolution Services 
Expertise: - Fidelity and financial institution bonds; 
- E&O; 
- Trade Credit Insurance Claims; 
- Investigation in Professional and Liability Claims; 
- Managed programs for Claim Handling and Risk Management 
Participant 7 
Role: Senior Underwriter Gender: Female Age: 33 
Location: Calgary, Alberta Type of Company: Canadian Insurance Company 
Expertise: - Technology & Cyber; 
- Offers custom cyber solutions to customers; 
- Private Security Coverage. 
Participant 8 
Role: Underwriting Specialist Gender: Male Age: Unknown 
Location: Montreal Quebec Type of Company: Canadian Insurance Company 
Expertise: - Technology Insurance Underwriting; 
- Manages Technology Portfolio; 
- Product Development; 




Role: Broker Gender: Male Age: 27 
Location: Montreal, Quebec Type of Company: Insurance Brokerage Cabinet 
Expertise: - Professional and Liability Insurance; 
- Business Development (Cyber Insurance); 
Insurance Brokerage Services.  
Participant 10 
Role: Underwriting Director Gender: Male Age: Unknown 
Location: Toronto, Ontario Type of Company: International Insurance Company 
Expertise: - Development of National Underwriting Guidelines; 
- Product Development & Legislation Analysis; 
- Develops Corporate and Regional Business Plans; 




2.2. Interviewing Process 
 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, times were arranged for telephone interviews with 
those who answered the email and showed an interest in taking part in the research. These 
interviews were planned to be only about thirty minutes each, as we did not want to inconvenience 
the participants. Yet, the interviews lasted well beyond this time. On average the interviews lasted 
43 minutes and 44 seconds where the longest lasted 1 hour 2 minutes and 54 seconds and the 
shortest lasted 34 minutes and 56 seconds.  
As previously mentioned, semi-structured interviews were the preferred method as they 
allowed the participants to fully express their knowledge without any restrictions (Poupart, 199). 
Most of the interviews (8/10 were conducted over the telephone, because these professionals came 
from different parts of Canada and in-person interviews were not possible. However, two other 
interviews were in-person; one participant was from Montreal and the other was from Toronto and 
on a business meeting in Montreal. 
For the research, both types of interviews (i.e., by telephone and in-person) had their 
advantages, which facilitated the gathering of data. Telephone interviews are theoretically cost 
effective as the researcher does not have to travel to partake in the research. This also enabled us 
to reach out to participants located across the country (Opdenakker, 2006). As a result, this allowed 
us to get a general understanding of cyber insurance across the country rather than just focus within 
the Greater Montreal Area. Moreover, we believe that the telephone interviews were favoured by 
the participants as they had the choice to do them in their location of choice. As an example, one 
of the participants did the interview on his way to meet his client an hour away from his office. 
We believe that this was an incentive as it allowed him to participate without losing any work time. 
Another advantage that was noticeable during the telephone interviews was that, often, the 
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participants would speak about certain insurance applications and articles. To clarify what they 
were talking about, they would send it to the email address provided as we spoke. This facilitated 
the discussion as we were able to consult the documents and ask questions if needed. However, 
certain difficulties were encountered when conducting telephone interviews. Like Carr and Worth 
(2001) suggested, it was noticed that we were not able to interpret the visual cues given by the 
participant. As an example, if the interview was too long, it was not possible to evaluate the 
participant’s fatigue. Additionally, it is possible that telephone interviews did not necessarily bring 
the participant to fully engage in an informal conversation. According to Creswell (1998), an 
informal conversation can allow the research to gain more insightful information as the participant 
becomes more comfortable with the interviewer. However, this advantage was not observed with 
the two one-on-one interviews that were conducted. After both one-on-one interviews, it was 
determined that they were not practical. In fact, this type of interview technique limited note taking. 
Even though these interviews were recorded, taking down certain ideas, references or key concepts 
that could have been explored in the current or future interviews would have been helpful. As per 
Grounded Theory, modifying the interviews as the data was collected was important as it allowed 
us to get a better understanding of the subject being studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, 
since only some notes could be written down during one-on-one interviews, insights may have 
been forgotten after the interviews were over.  
Regardless of the type of interview, it was essential to show signs of reflexivity and 
transparency. This was done to build a relationship of trust in order to maximize the data that could 
be made available (Pérez, Mubanga, Aznar, Aznar, & Bagnol, 2015). This was particularly 
necessary as several participants worked for well-known insurance companies and wanted to make 
sure that the information they were releasing would remain confidential. We had, in fact, assured 
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participants by email as soon as they manifested interest in participating; we had sent them all the 
necessary details and specifics of the research as well as two documents. The first document 
explained the confidentiality of the research, and the second document was a consent form that 
gave us the right to use the information provided. The consent form also mentioned that the 
participant could withdraw from the research at any moment. Nonetheless, no withdrawals 
occurred.  
 To begin an interview, a phone call at the scheduled time was made by the participant or 
the researchers. The first part of the interview was dedicated to explaining in greater detail the 
scope of the research, its particularities, as well as addressing any questions that the participant 
might have. Following the formal introduction, the second part of the interview focused on 
obtaining a summary of the participant’s background. This was done to get a better understanding 
of his professional path, as well as to gain insights as to why he might have certain opinions on the 
subject studied. The third section of the interview was dedicated to the field of cyber insurance 
and the participant’s perceptions thereon. This section was at the core of the research and directly 
related to the research question; by it, we tried to get a better understanding of how cyber insurance 
is perceived by the interviewees. Additionally, the section was designed to look at the different 
tools, techniques and data used to draft a policy and use insurance as a tool for risk governance. 
Finally, the fourth section of the interview pertained to the participant’s relationship with 
regulating bodies and third-party companies. Although there was a predetermined structure to the 
interview, it is important to note that these questions were not necessarily asked in succession. In 
fact, during the interactions, we allowed the participants to speak about their experiences and views 
freely. This was done to offer interviewees freedom in the information they wanted to provide, 
which is in line with Grounded Theory (Poupart, 1997). The structure, thus, was created to offer 
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only an initial guideline to the interview. However, it was rare that we had to bring a participant 
back to our structure; he would offer the answers to the structured questions without interruptions 
by the interviewer. This was beneficial as it allowed for a theoretical sensitivity, which consists of 
“placing preconceived ideas aside and immersing oneself in the data to discern what the 
participants perceive as meaningful” (Charmaz, 2012, p. 5). Thus, this allowed us, as interviewers, 
to construct our theory as the data was continuously received and analyzed (Charmaz, 2012). This 
process was also used when doing in-person interviews. 
 
2.3. Data Analysis & Coding  
 
While sequentially doing interviews, it is important to conduct a process called the constant 
comparative; such implies that the data emerging from interviews must continuously be compared 
and analyzed with previous interviews to look for similarities and differences (Walsh, Holton, 
Bailyn, Fernandez & Glaser, 2015). To do so, Grounded Theory implies that a standard approach 
divided in three specific categories must be applied. These categories, which aim to develop a 
substantive-level theory, are open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Creswell, 1998). 
Briefly, Bryant and Charmaz (2007) suggest that this process starts with open coding, which then 
gives way to the emergence of core categories, which are followed by a “delimiting of data 
collection and analysis for selective coding to theoretically saturate the core category and related 
categories” (275). Additionally, Creswell (1998) suggests that some research grounded in theory 
can create a visual portrayal of a conditional matrix, which will explain several phenomena, such 
as the social, historical and economic context that influenced the theory that was developed. That 




The first constant comparative is the open coding, which consists in creating initial 
categories of the phenomenon that is being observed. Within these categories, the researcher must 
find several subcategories that will be essential to provide a dimension or show the different 
possibilities that the gathered data can form (Creswell, 1998). This first part can be considered a 
tentative approach to developing the theory. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), during the 
early parts of open coding, the researcher must write different notes pertaining to his own personal 
thoughts, ideas, directions and impressions. By adopting this first step, the researcher will start 
asking himself relevant theoretical questions that will enable the emergence of initial categories 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
To facilitate theoretical sensitivity, the interviews were recorded, which all the participants 
agreed to. Following the interview, the recordings were transcribed in Microsoft Word where the 
document was divided into three distinct parts to avoid getting lost in several pages of notes. This 
also facilitated the labelling of categories.  There are several software, such as Mendeley, QDA 
Miner and Zotero, that facilitate the coding of the data. However, the coding was done manually 
with the use of colors and adhesive memo papers (Post-It) due to the habit of using such a method 
for previous research.  
In regard to the labelling, the first part contained all of the interview written verbatim. The 
second part contained the summary of several passages that seemed at first glance to be relevant 
to the research question. Finally, the third section was reserved for different codes assigned to the 
passages that were of relevance. These codes served to form initial categories and subcategories 
of the data. This approach, as suggested by Paille and Mucchielli (2012), allowed us to identify 
similar key words and reoccurring patterns with other interviews.  
47 
 
Following the open coding, the axial coding was used to continue extracting data from the 
interviews. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), axial coding is the process by which 
categories and subcategories are brought together and analyzed. This enables a better 
understanding of the categories and subcategories and allows one to combine them via a coding 
paradigm. According to Creswell (1998), the coding paradigm allows the researcher to conduct 
four specific tasks in order to be theoretically sensitive. These tasks are the following: Identifying 
the central phenomena conditions; Looking for causal conditions by which categories or 
subcategories can be found that will impact the phenomenon; Specifying strategies, which are the 
“actions or interactions that result from the central phenomenon” (Creswell, 1998, p. 57); Finding 
the context and the intervening conditions that will affect the strategies; and, finally, defining the 
consequences of the central phenomenon (Creswell, 1998). It is important to mention that this part 
of the analysis of our previous notes is the actual data. For Strauss and Corbin (1998), axial coding 
allows the researcher to develop different ways of analyzing the data and conducting further 
interviews. Additionally, it can help the researcher focus on certain categories or subcategories in 
future interview analyses (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
With the framework established by the axial coding, we started to think analytically about 
the subject. In fact, we started exploring different definitions given of cybercrime and cyber 
insurance, and the role the latter plays in risk governance. In addition, we took various categories 
and subcategories and furthered their analysis. This was done to summarize certain information in 
order to answer the four categories of axial coding. To enable this process, we followed Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1998) suggestion to create several diagrams, which allowed us to sort out the 
different relationships observed in our categories. Moreover, we used a separate box to create new 
categories that emerged within the data. This was done with the general understanding that, during 
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the early process of axial coding, some categories might be briefly defined or seem irrelevant 
altogether (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). However, as Grounded Theory suggests, until the data 
saturation is achieved, we must keep going back to the field of study to explore and find new 
information. Hence, by creating a box with new categories, we were continuously reminded of 
other subjects that were worth exploring and that may eventually become relevant. 
During the final part of our data analysis and coding, we followed the rules implemented 
by the selective coding. Selective coding is where the researcher integrates the findings elaborated 
in the axial coding. For Creswell (1998), this is where the researcher creates a story and where 
conditional propositions are presented. In fact, Strauss and Corbin (1998) claim that this is the 
final step of the analysis where “the integration of concepts around a core category and the filling 
in one of categories in need of further development and refinement” takes place (236-237). 
Generally, in this final category, fewer codes are found; however, there were more theoretical 
notes, which completed the final categories and, thus, elaborated the emerging theory. In fact, as 
we approached the end of the data analysis, our diagrams were used to elaborate our data whilst 
creating our theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This was done by taking our descriptive categories 
and translating them into analytical ones.  
As we neared the end of our coding and analysis, the selective coding helped us develop 
three important categories with several subcategories. To facilitate this process, we followed the 
indications of Strauss and Corbin (1998), namely, creating and bringing together the data found in 
our diagrams and memos. By applying open coding, axial coding and selective coding, we hoped 





3. Methodological Limitations  
 
 
Grounded Theory might seem like a research tool that allows the researcher a considerable 
amount of freedom. However, it is on the contrary an instrument that imposes rigorous procedures 
to be applied throughout the whole research process. Hence, these strict guidelines have 
contributed to certain limitations within the application of this methodological framework.  
Our study did not follow the optional fourth principle of theoretical sampling, namely, 
theoretical group interviews (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Theoretical group interviews refer to the 
process by which we could have gathered a small group of the participants with whom we would 
have shared our initial findings. After doing so, the group would have discussed the findings and 
potentially offered additional insights that could have benefited the emerging theory (Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2007). However, only one interview was conducted with each participant. While we 
believe that more interviews with the participants could have added value to our data, many of 
these professionals did not have time to take part in such due to their demanding schedules. Our 
timeframe was also limited.  
Another limitation associated with Grounded Theory has been highlighted by several 
researchers, such as Timmermans and Tavory, as well as Gibson; they have noted that, by 
employing this model, one cannot create theoretical sensitivity without any preconceived 
knowledge of the subject (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). However, to circumvent this potential 
problem, our literature review was completed not with the intention of enhancing our 
understanding of the subject matter but, rather, with the goal of creating and guiding our initial 
selection process through theoretical sampling. Additionally, the literature is often concerned with 
how other authors and researchers understand cyber insurance and what their perspectives are on 
the matter, given that some studied the subject using preconceived theories.  
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In relation to the notion of preconceived knowledge, researchers such as Locke (1996) and 
Walsh (2015) believe several studies that claim to employ Grounded Theory do not fully grasp its 
premises nor how to apply it in a study. Both Locke (1996) and Walsh (2015) argue that the theory 
is cited but not fully applied by researchers. Rather, Locke (1996) and Walsh (2015) argue that 
people tend to use this method for the apparent freedom that it allows within a study. Yet, they 
omit applying strict rules imposed by the theory, such as the rules of theoretical sampling. For 
Walsh (2015), this leads researchers to create their own conceptual framework which harms the 
epistemological framework. Additionally, Suddaby (2006) believes that ignoring GT’s 
recommendations can potentially harm the interpretive analysis of the data. The author believes 
that, instead of generating the theory through a strict analytical process, one will deduce results 
based on observations that are not separated from her preconceived ideas (Suddaby, 2006). Hence, 
to circumvent this potential problem, we opted to apply strictly the methods suggested by Strauss 
(1992). Strauss (1992) insists that we must continuously and conceptually describe all our 
observations. Using this form of analysis then allowed us to fully generate theories while limiting 











CHAPTER III: DATA PRESENTATION 
The Grounded Theory developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was used to generate a 
theory for this thesis regarding how insurance companies conceptualize cyber risks to quantify a 
residual or evolving loss. Additionally, this rule provided a better understanding as to the role 
insurance plays as an alternative to risk governance. Following a thorough theoretical coding 
process, the data obtained through the interviews revealed that cyber insurance is a preventive tool 
that takes on the role of three predominant factors:  Understanding Cybercrimes, Risk 
Management and Behaviors Towards Risk and Surveillance and Governance. These three factors 
contributed to form an alternative to traditional governance methods such as anti-viruses, firewalls 
and anti-spywares. This section will discuss our findings, as well as the theoretical concepts that 




Throughout the coding procedures, each interviewed participant was given the opportunity 
to express their own personal understanding of cyber insurance. The participants in the research 
hold roles within the field of insurance that are all equally important. For example, the insurance 
broker must continuously stay in touch with underwriters to obtain policies and quotes for their 
clients. However, the participants did not always display similar points of view regarding cyber 
insurance. Of course, because of the relatively new presence of this product on the market, some 
experiences and views varied to a certain extent. Thus, several categories, which encompassed the 




1.1. Cyber Insurance Defined  
 
As cyber insurance is a new product in the market, insurance companies strive to understand 
and assign a definition to this new risk. This is done with the goal of offering a product that meets 
the coverage needs of their customers.  The data obtained through interviews suggest that every 
company assigns a different meaning to what is covered by the insurance. Thus, understanding 
and defining cyber insurance and what it will cover is of greater importance, because the CGL has 
not viewed cyber losses as an insurance property (Yu, 2014). Moreover, for over 25 years, there 
was a computer crime policy that existed and according to participant 1, this product strictly 
covered the loss of funds. In fact, the main observation to make when defining what is covered by 
cyber insurance lies in understanding how the loss is incurred. The importance of the distinction 
made by these two types of coverage is based on the fact that many companies do not purchase 
cyber insurance. As seen in the Sony Corp. America vs. Zurich Re case, participant 4 states that 
companies that get breached will see if they are covered under the crime policy. Furthermore, 
traditional crime policies offer coverage for attacks made with the use of a computer. However, 
the difference between a traditional crime policy and cyber policy lies with how the data is acquired 
and what purpose it serves. As an example, participant 1 believes that:  
If the industry gets hit with a loss, one of the areas we see that is being questioned is 
whether the loss is a result of a direct hacking activity or a loss of data. Thus, this is a 
big issue to sort through to see where the loss resides. Is it in a crime policy or a cyber 
policy?  
For participant 1, the loss of funds should reside with a crime policy, because it directly deals with 
funds as opposed to data information which is not considered a tangible asset. Data information is 
considered valuable, but it is not immediately monetized. Thus, if you can sell the data for money 
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then it is a cyber related loss, but if you purposely take money out of the system it is a crime related 
loss. Similarly, participant 4 offers the same understanding of what differentiates a crime policy 
from a cyber policy. He argues that: 
 The commercial crime policy might say we [i.e., the insurance company] will pay 
losses sustained by the insured that are directly the result of computer fraud through a 
third party. Thus, if there is an unlawful taking of money using a computer system, it 
will be considered a crime policy (Participant 4).  
An example to demonstrate what is a cyber insurance loss is given by participant 10. He explains 
that if there is a negligent employee that facilitates access to a computer system from a third party, 
and this results in money being taken out of the company’s account, it will generally fall under a 
crime policy.  
 Based on the differences between a crime and cyber policy, it is evident that insurance 
companies try to define a cyber risk effectively in order to act as an additional tool to govern cyber 
risk. Based on several participants (1, 2, 8, 9), it seems that it is generally agreed that each company 
has their own particular definition of cyber insurance coverage which generally covers first party 
acts of online intrusions where information regarding the privacy and information of a company 
or an individual has been unlawfully accessed in a computer system through certain techniques 
like DDoS, Ransomwares and phishing tools. It also covers third party losses which are related to 
notification costs that companies must undertake to warn their clients that their information has 
been breached, as well as credit monitoring services. Third party losses also cover legal costs in 






1.2. Wording  
 
When defining cyber coverage and offering adequate protection, just like any other policy, 
the wording of the policy plays an important role in order to determine if the breach is covered 
under one’s cyber insurance. This is in part due to the evolving nature of cybercrime and the 
understanding that an insurance company has of the risk. According to participant 2 and 8: 
Security and privacy policies’ coverage, just like technology, are continuously 
evolving. Therefore, we need to update our wording at least annually or rewrite 
policies by adding endorsements to comply or take into account the development of 
laws and technologies (Participant 2).   
 Every insurance company updates their wording every now and then. In regard to 
cyber, its wording is being widely used with different meaning for individuals and 
companies. Thus, in the cyber world, it changes every two to three years. This is done 
to be in line with other companies and to keep a competitive presence in the market 
(Participant 8). 
The wording of policies is not only a priority for insurance companies to be able to offer 
competitive products, as well as be relevant to the market. The wording also plays a significant 
role when the insured company and the insurer are facing legal battles in courts so as to determine 
if the breach is covered under a cyber policy or crime policy. In fact, it was suggested that many 
merchants do not favour the purchase of cyber insurance. Many factors can be attributed to the 
refusal to adhere to such a product. For one, participant 3 suggests that some cyber policies may 
cost more than a regular CGL insurance. Participant 1, moreover, describes cyber insurance as an 
added cost that is not worth the investment. This is due to the fact that many small to medium 
business owners believe that an attack will not target them, because they are not a large 
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conglomerate. Similarly, participants 2 and 5 have observed this thought process amongst larger 
companies. Often, Chief Executive Officers (CEO) or Chief Security Officers (CSO) analyze their 
security investment through a cost-benefit approach and deem the cyber protection too expensive. 
However, when these companies are faced with a breach, and realize the investment cost required 
to restore their business activities, they look for loopholes in policies they already own, such as 
the crime policy, the CGL or the Error and Omission (E&O) to see if they can be compensated. 
An example of this scenario is given by participant 4:  
 The most important thing to keep in mind when looking at your cyber coverage is that 
it depends entirely on the policy wording and there is no standard wording yet. It 
depends on the wording of the policy on how cyber is determined. I’ve seen policies 
that had over 25 coverages and the first one might say we cover for any lawsuit against 
you in regard to a hacking incident. Then the question becomes, is this a hacking 
incident? And the policy will give a definition of hacking. So, the policy itself tells 
you what is covered and what isn’t. This is because there are all kinds of cybercrimes 
and therefore there are different provisions, such as for ransomware. The courts will 
then see it as a contract between two parties and will make a decision based on how 
they interpret the meaning of the wording, on previous case laws and the opinion of an 
IT expert (Participant 4). 
This concept of wording also seems to impact the work of insurance professionals. In 
regard to the broker’s perspectives, every client has certain needs in terms of IT protection. Hence, 
as suggested by participants 5 and 10, a broker must evaluate the needs of their clients and look 
for the best coverage for their business. This is of greater importance because provinces are 
governed by regulatory codes. For instance, Quebec, according to participant 9, is controlled by 
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the Regroupement des cabinets de courtage d’Assurance du Québec (RCCAQ). Therefore, it is 
important for the brokers to respect a deontology code which consists in conducting in-depth 
analyses of their clients’ needs. However, as participant 5 suggests, no cyber policy has the same 
coverage wording. Cyber products differ among every company as they carry different limits, 
premiums and they all cover different things. This diversity seems to be, according to participant 
5, the result of a lack of structure from regulatory bodies, such as the Insurance Bureau of Canada 
(IBC). Further, it suggests that the IBC gives a certain freedom for companies to develop their own 
coverage as the IBC is yet to develop a structure similar to the one seen with the CGL. As an 
example, participant 8 argues that: 
Cyber is very recent; 7 years is an infant in insurance. So, terminology is not common 
within all insurers. If you compare to other lines of business, such as the CGL, which 
goes back 200 years, everyone has a similar definition, as the IBC sets coverage 
standards and companies cannot offer less. From a cyber standpoint, the IBC did not 
set any standard, and most companies develop policies on their own; the terminology 
is not widely accepted by competing insurance firms. (Participant 8) 
These limits become quite complex as brokers, according to participants 4 and 9, need to 
develop IT knowledge in order to better serve their clients and suggest which coverage might be 
better suited for them. Moreover, the brokers must also be cautious to avoid underinsuring their 
clients. Several companies have offered general cyber insurance coverages, but these products do 
not fit the requirements of the clients. As an example, participant 3 mentions: 
If I have a small client, I can add for $94 a basic cyber policy. If we sell a full cyber 
policy, Intact won’t offer it and we need to go to an MGA who actually writes full 
blown cyber policies. This is because a $94 coverage is not enough as a breach can 
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cost over 100 000 dollars just in notification costs and Intact will only give $25 000 
which is not enough. Thus, that small package will result in clients being underinsured. 
(Participant 3) 
However, this difficulty also affects the underwriters. As previously mentioned, cyber 
insurance can be quite expensive and each company will cover the risk in their own way without 
a predetermined standard. Hence, participant 8 mentions that, on several occasions, brokers have 
gotten back to them with cheaper quotes from other companies and ask if they can match the price. 
This appears to be a difficult task because he is not aware of the wording and the coverage offered 
by his competitor. Participant 8 offers a great example of this problem: 
It’s always a bit challenging to compare ourselves to competitors and that is the 
challenge for brokers as they get quotes from different carriers and want to recommend 
to their client what is the best quote. So, obviously the premium is very important but 
it’s like buying a car. If I offer to buy you a Lexus, a Honda or a Lada, the price will 
be very different. From a cyber perspective, it’s very difficult for the brokers to 
compare the terminology used from one company to the next and factor the price 
difference. Similarly, for us underwriters, it’s hard as brokers can say “I got a better 
quote from a competitor, can you match it?” Well I may offer a higher premium and 
have a better coverage but really how do I know if I have access to the competitor’s 
wording. Yet my reading is only my interpretation and I am not in their shoes to 
understand what they are saying. 
The wording plays a significant role in what the insurance will cover and how it can help govern 
the cyber risk. Yet, other factors were observed with the various interviews, and another main 
concept in regard to governance is deduction and cyber resiliency.  
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1.3. The Lack of Data 
 
Throughout the literature, the absence of data has been often singled out as the main 
challenge that insurance companies must face when drafting a cyber policy. For participant 7, this 
is due to the limited number of claims that are made every month in Canada. Therefore, it is of 
interest to know what companies will do and how they will do it in order to push the sale of a cyber 
policy.  Additionally, as it was presented in Category B, different policies have different wordings 
which can create a great deal of complication when selling the policy to customers. Hence, there 
is an evident relationship between the disparity of wording and the lack of data made available to 
the insurance companies. This can be observed in participant 1’s statement: 
When it comes to the actual coverage itself, the industry has a pretty big blank on what 
is the quantification of a cyber breach policy. If the industry gets hit with a loss they 
did not foresee, that is when we will see the evolution of the product. (Participant 1)  
Similarly, participant 2 mentions this problem: 
When we have the risk defined, we do our best with the actuaries and the product 
underwriters to analyze and quantify the different security and privacy risks. However, 
we need more data to be available because the data is not very robust. (Participant 2) 
 Despite the lack of data, insurance companies need to develop products in order to compete 
with their rivals and offer their clients viable options. Thus, when faced with a minimum amount 
of quantifiable data, participant 2 explains that his company uses a theory coverage to estimate the 
potential claim. This is done by analyzing the companies’ infrastructures and data they hold, as 
well as previous claims that can possibly help them make an educated guess. However, as 
participant 5 notes, every cyber insurance policy is written differently and there is not a set method. 
Rather, he feels that insurance companies are just “throwing a dart” at what will be covered: 
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They tend to look at what is going on, and it’s kind of throwing a dart and saying, 
this company fits in this risk demographic; they have this revenue, security system 
and data; well, they will charge X dollar amount. (Participant 5) 
Participant 8 also suggests that when quantifying the data, it becomes somewhat of a guessing 
game.  
This product is in infancy and everybody – brokers, insurers and insured – are all trying 
to figure it out. Obviously, if you are trying to insure the convenience store next door 
which does not even have a credit card payment system and has very little personal 
information, well the exposure is not so high; you can think that a million-dollar 
liability is sufficient. If you have a company like Target, and you want to offer higher 
limits in liability and 100 to 150 million in first party coverage, you draft a policy 
based on that information and sometimes your guess can be as good as mine 
(Participant 8).  
However, it is important to mention that when analyzing a company that applies for cyber 
insurance, its revenue does not carry the same importance as the actual data it carries. As, an 
example, participant 5 explains that, even though one company makes an annual revenue of 100 
million dollars and holds records and/or patents of their business activities, their information is not 
as vulnerable as a company that generates 10 million dollars in revenue but holds thousands of 
Social Insurance Numbers (SIN). To summarize how the policy will be drafted, participant 7 offers 
a brief understanding on how it is evaluated: 
 For me, a lot of it comes from what you are doing, who are your customers, the data 
you have and what is your brand name (Participant 7). 
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 Despite suggesting that, when drafting a policy, it becomes somewhat of a guessing game 
or a theoretical coverage, this technique is supported by a questionnaire that is required to be filled-
out by the company requesting cyber coverage. For participant 3, this is required not only because 
there is not enough quantifiable information but also because every industry faces different 
realities and the information they hold can vary from one to another. Thus, the questionnaire allows 
the underwriter to get a better assessment of each company so he can better offer coverage. 
However, amongst many companies, the application may vary. For some it can be one page, while 
for others it can be a detailed questionnaire that goes well beyond 15 pages (Participant 3). 
Participant 3 explains the relevance of the application by stating the following: 
Everyone is underwritten according to an application that clients need to fill in. The 
one we deal with most is a one-page application, but some carriers ask for 15 pages 
and all the specifics. Some ask for one page because they know that the risk of getting 
hacked is high, so it does not matter what hardware is in place. All they ask is that the 
company does back-ups on a daily basis and has a firewall in place. Other carriers can 
require 15 pages to be completed, and can decline the application if the area is a high 
risk. (Participant 3) 
An example of what is asked in a detailed application is given by participant 2: before they issue 
a particular coverage to their clients, they require the company to fill out an application which 
gives the underwriter a better understanding of the security standards and controls put in place. 
When assessing this application, the underwriter seeks to analyze different factors than can help 
prevent a cyber breach and in turn reduce risk. In general, this application will check that a 
company has the following measures; a comprehensive security plan in place, understanding 
where the data is stored, a minimum control system which includes firewalls, good password 
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control, good patch management, strong monitoring and intrusion detection controls. Additionally, 
they should have a viable continuity plan and incident response program in case their protection is 
breached (Participant 2). If these measures are not in place, there is a possibility that the company 
will tell their clients that they cannot protect them unless they do so. Nonetheless, participant 2 
does mention that, even if a company does not have a strong security infrastructure, the insurer 
can issue them a policy if the underwriter judges that the risk is not too high.  
 Although the application is a viable tool to get a better understanding of what needs to be 
insured, some do not see the pertinence of sending it to clients. Participant 7, for example, argues 
that most of these questions are simply yes or no answers to standard security measures. An 
example of these questions can be: do you have an anti-virus? Do you have a firewall? Do you 
have physical security, etc. Participant 7, further, believes that originally these questions were 
simply designed to “prevent the low hanging fruit,” meaning, to deter companies that do not put 
anything in place to protect themselves from a breach. However, these questions do not seem as 
relevant because you can get breached regardless of the security measures in place. A breach can 
occur simply because an employee wrote his email under his keyboard or the employee did not 
take precautionary measures when opening a phishing email. Thus, a new questionnaire should 
put a greater emphasis on risk response processes put in place by the company to ensure business 
continuity. Additionally, questions should be geared towards asking if there is training offered to 
employees regarding cyber security, if there are security plans updated every 6 months, or if the 
company has best practices. Such questions will allow the underwriters to see if the company will 
be able to get back on their feet and restore their operation while reducing their downtime and 
limit the damages inflicted by an attack.  
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 The lack of data regarding cyber insurance in Canada evidently requires underwriters to 
use their instincts, in conjunction with the application, for the drafting of a policy. Nonetheless, 
there is also another tool at their disposal which is looking at how Americans draft policies. As it 
was previously mentioned, the U.S.A. has put in place legal provisions that require companies to 
disclose when a breach occurs, thus creating a higher number of claims to their insurance providers 
(Yu, 2014). As a result, Canadian insurance professionals can consult claims and strategies made 
across the border.  
 Participant 3 claims that the U.S.A has started writing cyber insurance policies for about 
10 years now as opposed to the Canadian landscape. Thus, she contacted a Managing General 
Agent (MGA) in the U.S.A. to place the cyber risk with the U.S company as they specialized in 
writing unconventional policies. Like participant 3, participant 7 also used the same approach: 
Four years ago, a standalone cyber insurance product launched and when it came out, 
I worked with a U.S company. The U.S. laws are more robust which allows for more 
information gathering and the creating of more comprehensive cyber coverages 
(Participant 7).  
The importance of looking at the American legal system and claims also lies in the Canadian 
courts’ lack of knowledge in properly judging court cases regarding cyber breaches. Several 
participants, such as 7, 8 and 10 argued that, while the laws forcing the disclosure of breaches will 
come about in the near future, as there are advanced talks regarding the Digital Privacy Act (2015), 
Canadian courts are unable to fully render a decision in these cases. Participant 7 believes that 
lawyers are not interested in these lawsuits because they take a lot of resources; they also feel that 
a big class action lawsuit will take several years to litigate in the courts and the money involved 
might not be worth it. Additionally, participant 4 argues that Canadian judges do not possess the 
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necessary knowledge in making decisions in these cases and will often rely on what has been 
decided in American contexts. Moreover, because there is uncertainty as to what is considered 
insurable, most cases, about 80%, will be settled outside the courts. This leaves the insurance 
companies with a minimal amount of information regarding cyber policies, and how and what 
should be included under such coverage (Participant 3). 
 
1.4. Information Networks 
 
Building on the information presented in the previous section, it seems that insurance has 
struggled to find adequate data to develop viable cyber coverage. A main category that came up in 
the interviews was information sharing. It is common knowledge that, in order to develop policies, 
you must have quantifiable data. Likewise, by quantifying data corresponding to data breaches, 
insurance companies can create products that are much more resilient and will contribute to the 
governance of the cyber threat (Participant 9). Hence, developing information sharing networks 
seems to be an important preoccupation for insurance professionals; it will allow them not only to 
perfect their products, but also to facilitate sales as clients will be much more aware of the threat 
and the premiums will not be as excessive.  To optimize information sharing, the participants 
suggested that it should be done at three distinctive levels; government bodies, companies and 
insurance professionals. 
 
1.4.1. Government Bodies  
 
One of the main distinctions that differentiates American and Canadian cyber insurance 
markets is the legislation enacted by the American government, which requires any company that 
is breached to render that information public (Insurance Institute, 2015). This, according to 
participant 7, allowed for better cyber insurance coverage to be available to the public. However, 
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because Canada has yet to pass the Digital Privacy Act (2015), companies are not obliged to release 
this information publicly. Therefore, cyber policies in Canada have not been as valuable for 
business owners as they have been for their American counterparts.  
For participant 5, the cost of cyber insurance is the main barrier and reason why it is not a 
product purchased by a majority of business owners. He argues the following: 
The cost of cyber insurance is the biggest entry barrier and until there is a requirement 
for you to notify people of a breach, until that point it will be an expensive product 
that some may or may not purchase.  
According to participants 9 and 10, forcing the notification of a breach will not only generate more 
data for insurance companies and consequently drop the prices of policies, but companies will 
voluntarily enhance their IT security systems, which will then reduce the possibility of 
considerable damages due to an attack, and result in reduced insurance prices. 
 Although the Canadian federal government has yet to enact the Digital Privacy Act (2015), 
there are some provinces that enacted provisions that force certain breaches to be brought to light. 
As an example, participant 3 mentions that in Alberta and British Columbia, laws are somewhat 
more restrictive in this regard. In fact, when a breach occurs, the commissioners of the respective 
provinces will evaluate how serious it is and can possibly require the targeted company to render 
that information public (Participant 3). Similar approaches are also observed in the Quebec and 
Ontario provinces, although therein laws are limited based on the nature of the information 
accessed. Both participant 5 and 8 argue that, if such measures are taken by the provincial 
governments, it is usually pertaining to information related to the medical field or, like in Ontario, 
the records of 500 000 students that were breached. Despite that most of the study participants are 
in favour of the Digital Privacy Act (2015) as it will give more data to insurance companies to 
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work with, participant 6 does not believe that it will be the case. The participant argues the 
following: 
The S-4 Bill1 will simply update the PIPEDA Act. It does not change much as with or 
without that legislation on this issue, there is not enough case law and history that will 
dictate this type of claim. You do not need statutes to force companies to come clean 
as it’s good practice… if you don’t you will expose yourself to more litigation. If you 
come clean, you can show the court that you acted in good faith. Therefore, I do not 
think that the legislation amendments will change anything especially in insurance 
(Participant 6).  
That being said, participant 10 argues that, on the contrary, when the government will force 
companies to divulge the breach it will be of greater impact for the industry as a whole. The 
participant believes that insurance is like a pool of water and one drop will not make a difference. 
However, if everyone comes together and the government obliges notifications of cyber breaches, 
this will allow for more quantifiable data, reductions in the cost of policies and stronger security 
infrastructures for companies. 
 
1.4.2. Companies  
 
Governmental policies will play a big role in helping the development of cyber insurance. 
Nonetheless, insurance professionals have also called upon companies to contribute to this effort. 
The effort, however, does not only come from those who have been breached, but also from 
companies offering additional security measures.  
Participant 9 argues that the development of cyber insurance is significantly dependent on 
the companies that have been breached, though. Despite the possibility of laws being enacted to 
                                                          
1 The Bill S-4 now became the Digital Privacy Act (2015).  
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force the disclosure of a breach, some business owners may choose not to disclose. According to 
participant 9, this can occur when the company fears facing class action lawsuits that can amount 
to millions of dollars, or simply because a cyber attack, unlike a fire, is not visible to their clients. 
This refusal to notify the public of the breach does not always play in their favour, though. For 
participant 6, if caught, the company will face additional lawsuits, such as professional 
misconduct, because they did not act in good faith. Moreover, participant 9 argues that by notifying 
the public of a breach it will not only allow the company to enhance their security software. It will 
also contribute to the reduction of the premium as the insurance company has more data to 
understand the risk they are facing. This opinion is also shared by participant 5; as mentioned in 
the preceding categories, the biggest barrier in the insurance industry is the cost of the policy. 
However, with more data obtained from companies, not only will the cost of the premium be 
reduced but it will also contribute to the development of much more comprehensive policies.  
Other than requiring the company to share information when they are breached, it is 
important for companies to fully disclose what type of information they have and from where it is 
coming. This is significant because, as participants 4 and 8 explain, when a Canadian company 
gets breached and they hold information of Americans it is the American legal system that can 
prevail. The participants state the following: 
Right now, if a Canadian company has personal information of Americans, it’s the 
American law that will apply. As an example, if you are a Montreal based company 
and you have clients in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, New York and California and your 
servers get hacked, the lawsuits will abide from each of the provinces’ or states’ 
jurisdictions. For me, it is more important to know where the clients are instead of the 
servers (Participant 8).  
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Depending on the case, they have a choice where to sue, such as the U.S.A or Canada. 
In the U.S. the laws are broad, so if you are a Canadian company and doing business 
in the U.S. you are potentially subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts 
(Participant 4). 
With this being the case, participant 4 argues that it is important for an underwriter to know this 
type of information for a given company, because when he is writing the policy, he will take it into 
consideration. This will work in favour of the client as he can benefit from coverage that goes well 
beyond the Canadian border. In fact, participant 8 suggests that, despite the rate being much higher 
if you have information in the United States, it is to the client’s advantage to disclose that 
information. This will allow him to benefit from a policy that covers breaches that involve the 
information of American citizens. 
 Additionally, partnerships with firms that provide additional security must be undertaken. 
In the following section, we will go in depth into how these companies, along with insurance, can 
contribute to a greater network resiliency. In particular, we will look at the benefits for such 
partnerships. According to participant 1, there are several firms that are used to monitor, identify 
and find solutions to enhance cyber security for their clients. Hence, participant 1 believes that 
information sharing with these security firms can be quite beneficial; it can contribute to and 
expand the quantitative information on cyber risk. He states: 
 I think their data can be sold in terms of reports, and I think it’s one area where 
insurance can go as it will buy their data and it will be helpful to analyze and quantify, 
which will then help them [i.e., insurance clients] with their protection and loss 
(Participant 1).  
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However, this idea is not shared by participant 10. He believes that when companies make a claim 
to their insurance, the insurance company will automatically have access to the data. Therefore, 
the data that these IT securities offer is not necessary. He sees them rather as a mandatory service 
that clients must purchase to reduce their exposure to the risk. 
 
1.4.3. Insurance Professionals  
 
A third means to facilitate information sharing is through insurance brokers. For participant 9, 
insurance brokers must act as the middlemen between their clients and the underwriters. The 
brokers must help their clients realize the data they have in their possession and who may want it 
(Participants 5 & 9). This is of great importance, because people do not seem to understand the 
information they hold nor, therefore, the risks involved. Participant 9 gives a pertinent example of 
how cyber insurance can apply to several industries whose management may not realize it. He uses 
the example of a fruit importer and states that, if you import fruits, you do not have any client 
information, but you do have a list of the inventory you are expecting online. If you get breached, 
you lose all of that information and are not able to keep track of your product coming in. This basic 
example shows how insurance professionals need to develop cyber insurance through different 
deduction techniques and promotion of the product. By doing so, according to several participants 
(3, 5, 7, 8, 9), if the clients understand the potential financial losses that a breach can create, many 
more business owners will purchase cyber coverage. Thus, if there is more risk, it will lead to a 
greater number of claims and in turn a greater public knowledge and quantitative data. Of course, 
as we saw in the previous sections, despite understanding or being aware of these breaches, 
business owners might not be interested in purchasing these protection products as they are 
expensive. However, participant 8 argues that, with more claims and a better understanding of the 
risk, the premiums will potentially be reduced. 
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1.5. Cyber Resiliency  
 
To apply for cyber insurance, as previously mentioned, a company must fill in an 
application which will give a better understanding to the insurer of what needs to be covered and 
under what policy. Additionally, insurance companies also offer their clients other services that 
can enhance the companies’ own network security. Thus, through the cyber resiliency category, it 
seems that insurance companies act as middlemen between companies seeking cyber protection 
and companies dedicated to providing it.  
According to participant 1, his company can offer their clients a support system that can 
enhance their cyber security. As an example of what can be done, participant 1 mentions the 
following: 
We basically help companies get anywhere they are at to a safer side of things. We 
can help support the response planning of the organization and form a seamless risk 
management approach. (Participant 1) 
Participant 1 also contracts third party firms that will do an assessment of the companies’ security 
systems. They, further, offer services that include monitoring capabilities and breach 
identification. This is done not with the intent of enhancing the cyber security of the company but 
to get the posture of the organization in terms of security. Additionally, participant 1 believes that 
the majority of companies, particularly small to medium businesses (SMB), do not have in-house 
experts that can guarantee the security of their network. Participant 5 argues that this is a significant 
problem as SMBs carry a lot of significant data and do not want to purchase cyber insurance due 
to the elevated cost. Thus, by asking the insurance companies to conduct such assessments or hire 
third parties to monitor the cyber security aspect, this can be beneficial; it reduces the chances of 
a breach occurring and possibly premiums for the coverage, making the purchase of such more 
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attractive (Participant 1). However, there are strong possibilities that the client will, nonetheless, 
refuse the policies. In such a scenario, participant 5 believes that the only remaining benefit is that 
they educated the business owners of the reality of a cyber breach.  
 Similar to participant 1, participant 2 mentions that his teams of insurance professionals 
get together in order to look at what the best practices are for privacy controls and try to figure out 
what controls companies should have in place to safely guard their data.  Moreover, participant 2 
states that his company does have inside experts that can conduct the same functions as mentioned 
by participant 1. He believes that this is of great importance, because often organizations are not 
aware of the data they actually have and even if they are, they are unable to understand their own 
risk. Thus, by having the inside expertise, insurance companies can help companies adopt stronger 
cyber security practices. Yet, it is important to mention that not all insurance companies put so 
much effort into understanding the cyber threats to an organization. According to participant 3, 
certain insurance companies believe that every company can get hacked. Therefore, it does not 
matter what hardware is in place; such insurance firms are not actively trying to determine the 
actual security background of companies. 
 Other than offering cyber security assessments, participant 3 argues that cyber policies also 
offer the possibility of facilitating a fast response time following an attack. In fact, she argues that 
it is necessary to contact these security firms provided by insurance companies as they are properly 
trained to diminish the risk and find alternative solutions to solve a breach. Participant 3 states the 
following:  
Cyber policies are different. As an example, there is a 1-800 number for cyber policies. 
So, if you think you’ve been hacked, you call this number and they will place their 
own teams in the situation depending on the breach. If it was a ransomware that asks 
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for $50 000 before the information is released, the 1-800 team will takeover to see if 
they can get that information without paying the ransom. It is really important that 
these people are contacted right away so they can help the client through the process. 
If the client tries to do it on their own, they will mess it up 9 times out of 10 as their 
IT guys are not appropriately trained like the company that will help them get through.  
Just as the response teams are necessary to assist organizations that have been breached, insurance 
companies also have IT experts that will analyze the breach. Of course, this is done to investigate 
the claim and ensure it is not fraud against the insurance company, but according to participant 6, 
this also helps the breached company to understand what happened and how a cyber attack can be 
prevented. In terms of how the breached companies will investigate claims pertaining to cyber 
attacks, participant 6 explains that it will allow the breached company to hire IT experts to 
investigate the breach and look for solutions to protect the network from future claims. It is also 
possible that bigger companies will have their own experts. If such a scenario presents itself, the 
insurance company will also bring in their own experts to verify the incident. However, not all 
business owners can benefit from this type of service if they did not purchase the right policy, or 
if they just purchased the basic packages mentioned previously. Nonetheless, participant 6 
suggests that he would not necessarily ignore a request from such a breached organization. He 
would still recommend certain companies that can help with incident responses, but it would be 
paid for by the company that is breached not the insurance.  
 Similar to what participant 6 mentioned, participant 7 also argues for the benefits of holding 
a cyber insurance policy. He strongly recommends that businesses invest in cyber security or, if 
you are a SMB, to hire an IT security company. That said, the participant mentions that IT security 
companies create a false sense of security as they do not offer 100% protection, nor do they offer 
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contingency plans to keep the business running. Additionally, they do not offer business 
interruption services, such as those addressing public relation issues, legal counselling or 
notifications costs. Thus, it is to a company’s benefit to have cyber coverage; if they do, the 
insurance company will help the business recover from second and third-party issues caused by an 
attack, services not given by an IT company. Finally, several participants suggest that, despite 
having strong IT security and cyber coverage, most companies absolutely need to invest in training 
their employees. In regard to cyber attacks, employees are often the main causes. Thus, by having 
a properly trained workforce, the chances of an attack can be more easily reduced (Participant 3, 


























CHAPTER IV: DATA ANALYSIS 
Risk is something that needs to be accepted, challenged, eliminated or when possible 
mitigated (Elliot, 1960). The literature shows that insurance is not only a risk management service 
that eliminates or reduces the cost of a certain type of risk (Mowbray & al., 1979). Insurance, 
represents an institution of applied knowledge and social necessity. Moreover, insurers approach 
to manage risk allows them to have a considerable impact on the development of preventive 
measures, compensation for losses and the possibilities to engage in risk taking practices (Ericson 
& al., 2003). Additionally, information that is gathered by the insurance industry contributes to 
transformation of a hazard to a risk. This risk can be, to a certain extent, controlled. As Ewald 
(1991) mentioned, objectifying the risk will render it a normality. This permits organizations to 
better adapt their security measures and conceivably diminish their chances of submitting a claim 
(Heimer, 2003). This, however, also permits the insurance industry to govern and regulate the 
behaviors of risk takers, which in this case are privately owned companies (Baker, 2003; Heimer, 
2003).  
These social implications are made possible due to actuarial technologies and the concept 
of probability. Probability, according to Landsman and Sherris (2001), is determined by statistical 
data, economic expectations and fluctuations, as well as losses previously claimed on similar 
coverages. Although the concept of probability is present, according to our data, when a cyber 
policy is evaluated, cyber insurance products cannot rely on traditional actuarial models to issue 
coverage and a premium to a business owner. This discovery was facilitated using the Grounded 
Theory. In fact, this theory was used to deduce how insurance companies conceptualize cyber risks 
in order to quantify a residual or evolving loss. The results of this research did not lead us to a 
clear understanding of how the insurance industry conceptualizes cybercrime. Nevertheless, it 
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allowed us to find relevant concepts on the cyber insurance industry, particularly how new forms 
of risk are integrated in the field. This study also allowed us to discover how active players within 
the insurance field can utilize cyber insurance as an additional security tool to protect a company’s 
virtual data. Based on the Grounded Theory, it is possible for the researcher to start with a research 
question, but through its methodological applications, develop and conclude different results 
(Creswell, 1998). 
The insurance industry can act as a preventive tool in two ways. First, cyber insurance can 
only be considered a preventive tool if coverage is being considered by a company. By this we 
mean that business owners consider or purchase cyber coverage in respect to their cyber needs, 
such as the security of virtual data and its infrastructures. On the other hand, insurance companies, 
through risk classification, are excluding individuals deemed risky from their pools (Heimer, 
2003). Second, it can be argued that insurance is a valuable preventive tool only if the applicants 
fall within acceptable risk categories. Due to the novelty of cyber insurance products, it continues 
to foster the same sociological implications that traditional products offer. This section highlights 
how cyber insurance not only acts as a financial preventive tool.  Rather, this study reveals how 
its functions are one of many approaches to manage modern risk. These implications contribute to 
the development of preventive measures, compensations for losses, social planning and the 
freedom to take risks (Ericson and Doyle, 2004). These premises will be discussed through the 
following three sections: Understanding Cybercrimes, Risk Management and Behavior Towards 






1. Understanding Cybercrimes  
 
Ericson and his associates (2003) suggest that insurance institutions are effective risk 
managers that prevent the spreading of the risk. This is achieved by assign themselves the 
responsibility of quantifying and commodifying the risk through actuarial and underwriting 
practices. In turn, this facilitates the implementation of preventive measures and the 
indemnification of their clients (Ewald, 1991). To do so, insurance professionals will objectify 
anything that can be perceived as risk. These professionals, such as actuaries and underwriters, 
create policies based on a measurement of available data (Vaughan & Vaughan, 2003). This refers 
to the concept of ratemaking and probability. To measure data and create a policy, actuaries will 
analyze the risk based on industry statistics, a company’s previous losses, and the insurance 
industry’s accumulated data based on past claims (Rejda, 2011). To control the risk, insurer will 
typically call upon different actuarial models to predict the risk. Examples include the 
Monopolistic Cyber Risk Probability, suggested by Landsman and Sherris (2001), and the Utility 
Based Preferential Pricing (UBPP), suggested by Mukhopadhyay and his colleagues (2013). In 
turn, this renders the risk a normality and society will simply view the event as accidental (Ericson 
& al., 2003). As an example, car accidents are now associated as one of many risks that can 
possibly arise when taking the decision to enter a vehicle. However, cyberattacks are yet to be 
considered “normal”. The data found that insurers are struggling to fully grasp this reality. Part of 
the issues, as stated by several participants (4-5-8-10), is that each company has different wording 
when insuring cyber. This is the also the case for regulatory bodies such as the IBC. Participant 8 
mentioned that regulatory bodies did not implement specific guidelines when insuring against 
cybercrimes. Similarly, participant 4 and 9 mentioned that there is an urgency for the industry to 
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get a better understanding of IT knowledge as it will enable them to better asses their clients’ cyber 
insurance needs. 
To better understand the risk, it was reported that the insurance industry calls for the latest 
technologies. (Ericson & al., 2003). However, this does not seem to currently be the case for the 
cyber industry. To evaluate the risk, the insurance companies require business owners to complete 
an application that details the network security efforts made by the applicant. This application 
would allow the insurance company to classify the organization and evaluate the risk they face 
when cybercrimes occur (Majuca & al., 2006). This approach seems to reflect the concept of a 
Risk Management Audit (Vaughan & Vaughan, 2003) which is an in-depth analysis of a 
company’s risk profile. Following the reception of this application, participant 2 explained that 
they will do an assessment of the needs and come up with a theoretical coverage. At first, this form 
seems to bypass the lack of data needed to establish insurance policies as it collects primary data 
that is not normally found in basic actuarial concepts. On one hand, it is a useful technique to 
contribute to the understanding and dissemination of knowledge about risk. Knowledge diffusion 
refers to “the spread of knowledge from an original source or sources to one or more recipients” 
(Robertson & Jacobson, 2011, p. 1). Robertson and Jacobson (2011) argue that knowledge 
diffusion regarding new technology is essential as it allows for innovation, implementation and 
economic growth. My analysis argues that knowledge diffusion is beneficial to insurance 
companies in two ways. The first is that by constantly reworking their wording and collecting 
information (data) regarding cyber breaches, insurance companies are turning a risk into a 
normality. This is made possible as insurance professional are continuously gathering a 
considerable amount of data, which will enable them to better predict the cyber risk. Despite the 
benefits of the application form, I also note that insurers are maintaining the concept of risk 
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classification. This is clearly highlighted when participant 7 mentions that most of these questions 
are asked to “prevent the low hanging fruit”. It can be reasoned that insurance institutions are 
defining what are considered good cyber security practices and those that harm the risk pool. This, 
as it was stated in the literature review, is done to diminish the chances of a claim being submitted 
and leave the insurance institution with less funds for their investment portfolio (Heimer, 2003). 
After administering the audit, some professionals revealed that, to a certain extent, they guess what 
needs to be insured. For example, participant 8 explained that “you draft a policy based on that 
information and sometimes your guess can be as good as mine”. Similarly, participant 5 refers to 
underwriting a cyber insurance policy as “throwing a dart” and hoping that the company will 
reflect the demographic they are insuring. From this feedback, I take away that risk classification, 
combined with this guessing approach, enhance the opportunity for crimes to be committed. In the 
event of a cyber intrusion, the company may not receive the necessary financial support to restore 
its cyber infrastructure to continue its business activities. Besides restoring business activities, field 
studies have shown that various consequences are associated to an attack. For example, there have 
been events where attackers accessed a company’s clients banking information, social insurance 
numbers, medical records and other private information (Verizon, 2018). This, according to the 
Insurance Institute (2015), can eventually force companies to face several lawsuits requiring them 
to financially indemnify their clients and pay for credit monitoring services. Additionally, the 
breached company will need to change, update or restore its infrastructures. However, if a 
company does not have the financial strength to restore its business activities, it may completely 
cease to exist. In addition, I predict that it can increase the number of cyber attacks. As companies 
are not equipped to improve their cyber security infrastructures, I expect that a signal of 
opportunity will be received by attackers, which could facilitate opportunities for future violations. 
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Despite these limitations, I remain convinced that insurance can potentially develop sufficient 
knowledge about cybercrime and can become a significant risk management product. In the next 
section, we will examine the different ways in which insurance is adopted as a prevention tool. 
 
2. Risk Management and Behavior Towards Risk 
 
So far, we have seen that cyber insurance professionals have a limited understanding of cyber 
crime which forces them to guess their clients' coverage. This could create opportunities for crime 
because companies do not have the necessary financial support to strengthen their security 
measures, allowing hackers greater facility to access a company’s data. This difficulty can be 
associated to the limited amount of knowledge and understanding that the insurer owns. 
Independent from the limits discussed, I noted that the industry is at an immature state yet forward-
looking; it is taking steps towards cyber risk management. This reinforces Hacking's (1990) 
argument that the insurance industry is an institution that provides an understanding of risk while 
developing its science. In addition, it also reinforces the idea that insurance is becoming a social 
necessity since it has societal implications for a company's decision regarding loss prevention 
measures, social planning and freedom to take risks (Ericson & al., 2003).   
The application method discussed in the previous section seems to be the preferred 
assessment model of insurance professionals. I deduce that using such an approach helps explain 
why coverages vary amongst companies. According to our category Wording and Lack of Data, 
insurance professionals use an educated guess. Therefore, the coverage fully depends on the 
actuary or underwriter’s intuition-laden analysis. Consequently, this creates a struggle for brokers 
to find which coverage better suits the needs of their clients as different companies have different 
meanings assigned to the cyber coverage (Participant 2 & 8). Similarly, underwriters also struggle 
79 
 
to offer a coverage that matches the rate of its competitors as they are not aware of what was 
considered in other policies (Participant 8). Despite the differences found in cyber policies, the use 
of applications and theoretical assumptions leads to a considerable amount of effort being put into 
updating the wording of a policy and in turn implementing itself as a social necessity which enable 
business owners to take decisions on risk. As an example, participants 2 and 8, suggest that 
updating the wording of a cyber policy is done annually in order to stay competitive within the 
market and adapt to new realities.  
 I argue that continued efforts to make policies more comprehensible will eventually 
transfer knowledge to the insurance consumers. This can increase profits, but it also assists all 
applicants in making informed decisions. For example, participant 5 mentioned that those who do 
not adhere to cyber insurance policies will, at the very least, be educated of the realities of cyber 
breaches. This form of education diminishes the number of individuals that will take decision 
towards risk based on perception rather than the understanding of risk probabilities (Ericson & al., 
2003). With knowledge transfer, an organization is better suited to understand the security gaps 
and take necessary steps to protect the data it holds. For example, the company may decide to 
improve its security measures and educate its own employees to adapt safer practices on the 
Internet. Verizon (2018) reported that a considerable number of attacks against a company are 
often facilitated by an employee's lack of awareness. However, if employees are better informed 
about this, it can reduce the risk of a company being the victim of a privacy breach. This supports 
Ericson and Doyle’s (2003) argument that it ought to become a reflexive knowledge. 
 In addition to risk education, the insurance industry contributes to risk management 
through its audits. Generally, the risk manager, according to Vaughan and Vaughan (2003), must 
follow the following five steps; determine security objectives, identify the risks, evaluate the risks, 
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consider and select risk management products, implement security efforts and finally, evaluate the 
effectiveness of security efforts. Similarly, the Insurance Institute (2015) suggests that a company 
should apply the OSFI guidelines to establish an effective security framework. Based on the 
outlined tasks, I believe that insurance companies, when studying the insurability of a company, 
apply the measures outlined by Vaughan and Vaughan (2003) and the Insurance Institute (2015)  
 When looking at cyber security coverage, it was made clear that clients are handed out an 
application (participants 2, 3, 7, 8). I argued that this application allows both the underwriter and 
the applicant get a better understanding of the security framework that is present within his 
company and the value of the data. I argue that the 15-page application is better suited for the 
insurance industry if it were to successfully act as a risk manager. An advantage of the fifteen-
page application is that a one-page does not serve and fulfil the role of a risk manager. This is 
deduced because participant 3 mentions that a one-page application is just to get a general 
understanding and that it does not matter what measures are in place; the probability of getting 
hacked is high regardless. On the other hand, by completing a detailed questionnaire, the insurance 
company will be better suited to fully assess their insurability (Participant 3). By doing so, as 
participants 5 and 10 mentioned, the insurance professionals will be better equipped to evaluate 
the needs of their clients. In turn, they allow for the implementation of an IRM plan, which is 
similar to participant 1’s suggestion that his company supports the planning of a risk management 
approach. 
An IRM plans usually consists of 4 mandatory steps, which are risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk reduction measures and risk monitoring (Bandyopadhyay, Mykytyn & Mykytyn, 
1999). The first is to identify the risk. In this sense, the evaluation will conduct an analysis of a 
company’s security plan, understanding where the data is stored, as well as the control system, 
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patch management, monitoring and intrusion detection controls that are put in place. In addition 
to these standard questions, I agree with participant 7 who mentions that the analysis must consist 
in verifying if the company has security plans, if training is offered to their employees and if the 
company has contingency plans set in case of a breach. It is also important to mention that not all 
companies face the same risk. As an example, participant 9 mentions that a fruit importer may 
believe that, because he does not own any client information, hackers will not be interested in his 
data. However, an attacker could hijack the shipment information and the vendor would not be 
able to deliver the products to his clients. Thus, this type of analysis allows the IRM plan to be 
customized to the needs of their clients.  
The second step is to analyze the risk. This analysis is used to evaluate the extent of 
damages and losses that could be caused by an attack to an IT network (Bandyopadhyay & al. 
1999). The interviews show that insurance contributes to this analysis by helping realize the nature 
of each company. In fact, participant 5 gives a relevant example as to how this is analyzed. He 
argues that it does not necessarily mean that because you have a higher revenue that cyber 
insurance will cost you more. A company that makes 10 million dollars in revenue, for instance, 
but holds thousands of SIN numbers is a lot more at risk than a company that makes 100 million 
dollars in revenue but only holds the company’s patents (Participant 5). Thus, by keeping in mind 
the realties that any line of business holds, insurance companies can better inform companies about 
the potential risk they may face.  
The third step of implementing an IRM plan is to adopt risk-reducing measures. As the 
questions in the application look at the security measures that are put in place, insurance can 
suggest additional security. As an example, participant 2 mentions that he and other insurance 
professionals will get together to analyze the security infrastructure of a company and will 
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determine if the applicant can benefit from coverage. However, if they judge that the client’s 
security measures are not sufficient they may require them to enhance them to be insured. I believe 
that the first two steps will permit business owners to get a better understanding of what is at stake. 
Thus, as participant 1 suggested, they are potentially more likely to enhance their security 
measures if the risk is brought to their attention. Additionally, participant 2 mentioned that if 
additional security measures are adopted, an applicant can benefit from a reduction of the premium, 
and, if they refuse, they will not always be covered. Hence, due to the considerable financial impact 
of a cyber breach and the incentives offered by insurance companies, business owners will be more 
inclined to adopt stronger security measures.  
The final step in the IRM plan is insurance helping companies with their risk monitoring. 
According to Bandyopadhyay (1999) and his colleagues, risk monitoring is the step whereby a 
company ensures that the security measures that are in place will continuously be implemented 
and strengthened if needed. However, this part will be studied further when looking at how 
insurance contributes to the surveillance and governance of risk as suggested by Ericson and his 
colleagues (2003). 
Arguably, these steps persist in classifying their customers and do not make insurance a 
valid solution for some companies seeking to improve or invest in cyber security efforts. This 
seems evident as this application is used for the insurance industry to look for clients that are 
already cyber responsible and will not affect the integrity of the pool (Heimer, 2003). In fact, 
participant 2 clearly mentioned that clients can be refused coverage if they do not meet certain 
protection standards, unless they prove to enhance their security measures. I argue that the industry 
can also apply this concept to stay competitive within the market. The previous sections showed 
that different coverage is developed by the industry and they all differ amongst each other. In 
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addition, coverage can also be more expensive than the CGL. Thus, by pooling their clients and 
contributing to the risk classification, they will be better suited to offer a coverage with a price tag 
that entices business owners (Baker, 2003).  Additionally, Baker (2003) also mentions that this 
enables the company to possibly transfer clients with a higher risk to their competitors.  
 Despite the evident goal of these risk audits from the insurer, it can however, continue to 
play a valuable role in the protection of cyber crimes. For one, classification is a collective sharing 
of burdens that creates a collective responsibility towards risk (Ericson & al., 2003). Similarly, 
Baker (2003), mentions that risk classification is a good thing as without it, low risk individuals 
would have to subsidize the high risks individuals. It also promotes both individual responsibility 
and the prevention of loss.  
 Of course, the decisions to purchase a cyber coverage are easily influenced by the cost-
benefit analysis. Looking at security through an economic lens will facilitate the allocation of 
resources. Similarly, engaging in a cost-benefit analysis is done when a business owner looks at 
the data he owns, the probability of being attacked and the economic losses that can be suffered 
by his company (Gordon & al., 2003). Through the interviews, I found similar results. According 
to participants 3 and 5, many business owners are interested in cyber coverage. However, one of 
the greatest barriers to this product is the cost associated to it. For participant 3, the cost of cyber 
coverage can be more expensive than a regular CGL coverage. Additionally, participant 1 
mentions that after seeing the price of a cyber policy, many business owners will not purchase the 
coverage, because it is too expensive, and they believe that an attack will not target them as their 
information is not valuable. Yet, I previously highlighted that over half of the breaches reported 
(58%) targeted small to medium businesses (Verizon, 2018).   
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This cost-benefit is a considerable factor in purchasing cyber insurance and security 
measures. Business owners may decide to continue with their current security measures. Regarding 
crime, this can have devasting effects. Evidentially, weak security measures will facilitate the 
opportunity of being attacked. In fact, this is shown through the Rational Choice Theory. The 
theory supports that individuals will engage in criminal behaviour if there is a given opportunity 
that will outweigh the costs (Kemshall, 2006). By neglecting preventive security measures, cyber 
criminals will view this as an opportunity to access sensitive information. However, it is important 
to note that the insurer's role as risk manager is only effective for those who choose and are chosen 
to contribute to the risk pool. Furthermore, the insurance only applies to cybercrimes for those who 
are considered insurable. An analysis for those that are considered uninsurable will be presented 
in the Surveillance and Governance section.  
Though the cost-benefit ratio is a significant factor that can prevent companies from adhering 
to the implementation of security tools, I argue that companies who adhere to cybersecurity 
standards, contribute to a safer cybersecurity landscape. In this sense, these applications may be 
comparable to criminogenic risk assessment tools that seek to quantify data, in an effort to prevent 
crime or the risk of recidivism. That said, one can argue that these applications can only be 
beneficial for those who decide to buy a policy. I argue that this is not necessarily the case. The 
purpose of the audit is to assess a client's insurability. Although a client may refuse insurance, the 
audit identified vulnerabilities in their cyber infrastructure. In light of this information, the client 






3. Surveillance & Governance 
 
Undoubtedly, the complexities of cybercrime make it difficult to govern. The literature 
review pointed out that government agencies do not facilitate the development of cyber insurance 
in Canada. This is because mandatory notification laws are still waiting to be enacted (Shackleford, 
2012; Insurance Institute, 2015). Yet, insurance can also help the government develop cyber 
security knowledge and practices. For Moss (2002), in Ericson and Doyle (2004), the State is at 
the head of risk management. Similarly, Garland (2003) suggest that in our society, governments 
are expected to act as the general risk manager.  
Typically, the state is an information resource and communication hub for traditional 
crimes (Baker & al., 2003). However, regarding cybercrime, the governments and their law 
enforcement agencies do not possess all the knowledge and the financial power to deter and 
investigate the majority of breaches. (Choo, 2011). Through this study, I found that insurance is 
also information rich, and I argue that it should be a supplement to the governance of cyber risk. 
One of the reasons for this is that cybercrimes have no borders. For Choo (2011), there are not 
enough policing resources to trace a cyber attack. This makes public entities simply one of the 
many players that will contribute to a stronger cyber security environment. This view is reinforced 
by Beck (1992), as he states that modern society is composed of different institutions which 
contribute to the production of knowledge and that shape our behavior towards risk. Similarly, 
insurance is a crucial asset to manage “the everyday world of safety and security” (Ericson & 
Doyle, 2004). From this research, I deduce that insurers have a significant social responsibility to 
evaluate and act upon risk. Their decisions have society-wide consequences for the functioning of 
capital, loss prevention strategies, loss systems and the freedom to take risks. I continue to argue 
that insurance has similarities to government. First, through contracts, insurers define social 
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behaviors of their customers. These contracts define what is expected from of the parties’ ethical 
conduct, moral and social responsibility. We saw that insurers stipulate eligibility of coverage 
based on behavioral conduct and rely heavily on this before deciding who to insure. 
In addition, this research has led me to conclude that the insurance industry influences the 
social well-being of society by adopting moral codes that must be respected. Just as the laws 
govern our society, policyholders are expected to self-regulate their own behaviors and practices 
in order to comply with insurers' rules.  It can further be argued that the industry adopts these 
methods to govern from a distance (Ericson & al., 2003). This could be done to reduce the 
opportunities for some individuals to engage in moral hazards. This is not surprising, as 
government social controls are also transgressed by individuals. 
To counter moral hazards, insurance uses similar policing methods to government. It has a 
private policing structure, such as investigators, to combat fraud and to prevent loss reductions. 
Participant 3 mentioned that their clients have access to a 1-800 number when they believe they 
have been hacked. Amongst many roles, this resource assigns cybercrime professionals to respond 
to the situation and contain the consequences of the breach or restore one’s virtual infrastructure. 
For this matter, the insurance industry is engaging in a first response approach, like government 
law enforcement agencies. 
However, this does not mean that the state must disengage from governing cybercrimes. 
For one, the insurance industry is not a law enforcement agency and does not have the ability to 
legally charge individuals for any type of crime. Rather, as Cauchie and Chantraine (2005) argue, 
the insurance industry applies a neo-liberal managerial model, which is used to deter individuals 
from engaging in behaviors that are considered risky. This is in line with Ewald (1991), who 
mentions that for insurance controls to work, it must be a collective social responsibility of 
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everyone in the risk pool. This leaves applicants who did not fall within acceptable risk classes 
without insurance. Furthermore, this leads to the following question: Is it possible that applicants, 
who are filtered out, will not be able to adopt adequate security measures? I argue that they are 
more at risk because they might not have the knowledge or the financial strength to enhance their 
security measures. The governance of cybercrimes needs to also be the responsibility of the state. 
For example, the government can enact laws and regulations that will impose certain behaviors to 
adopt on virtual platforms. It’s simply not sufficient for the burden to fall in the hands of private 
institutions; the private and public institutions must work in partnership. 
Despite the need for government to actively regulate cybercrimes, there is an absence of 
concrete law enforcement tools to manage this new reality of crime. I argue that cyber insurance 
will be able to collect a large sample size of breaches relevant to different industries. I believe that 
this accumulation of knowledge will allow the insurance industry to profit from partnerships 
between public and private stakeholders. This is possible because insurance companies have an 
overview of security requests across various industries (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). Thus, both 
sectors can consult the insurance industry to better understand what information is most likely 
sought by attackers. In addition, the insurance industry can suggest what are the most effective 
measures to reduce the risk of violations. Additionally, the public sector, governments can request 
insurance companies to provide them with information on breaches. By gaining access to this 
information, governments can enhance their own infrastructure and consequently, preserve the 
online safety of their citizens. However, it is important to point out that although the information 
can used by government, information sharing between the public and private sector needs to be 





Using the Grounded Theory developed by Glasser and Strauss (1967), this study initially 
aimed at studying how insurance companies conceptualize cyber risks to quantify a residual or 
evolving loss. However, the Grounded Theory brought me to find results that go beyond the 
conceptualization of cyber risk. As it was suggested, the work of insurance companies goes beyond 
reducing the financial cost caused by the event of a risk (Elliot. 1960; Mowbray & al., 1979). 
Ericson and Doyle (2004) make an important distinction. According to these authors, insurance 
“is a key innovator and participant in communication systems that produce and distribute 
knowledge of a risk. It takes an active role in the development and implementation of loss 
prevention infrastructures.” (289). Hence, the research revealed that insurance companies are an 
important tool to understand, manage and govern cyber security.  
Due the novelty of cyber insurance, little quantifiable data is available to issue adequate 
coverage (Yang and Lui, 2014). However, the ongoing work made by the insurance industry is 
slowly changing this reality. I argued that by constantly working on their policy wording, they are 
turning the risk into a normality. However, the industry is maintaining risk classifications 
techniques. In turn, this facilitates the opportunity to commit crime as certain companies do not 
have the financial backing to strengthen their virtual security and make it harder for attacker to 
breach their systems. 
Understanding of the breach and knowledge accumulation has also been facilitated through 
an application form used to evaluate a company’s cyber security network. This application also 
facilitates insurers to assume a risk manager role. They do this in two ways. The first, facilitated 
by Knowledge Diffusion, is to help customers better understand their business data and the security 
measures to adopt once the application is complete. Following this step, the insurance company 
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can suggest different strategies and components that can be adopted to make their business operate 
on a more resilient platform. Among these strategies, insurance companies facilitate the 
implementation of an IRM plan. This plan will not only help to mitigate security breaches, also 
reduce the number of people affected. 
 Finally, the insurance industry, as mentioned by Ericson, Doyle and Barry (2003) are a 
complement to the governance of new risk. Evidently, the insurance industry adopts similar roles 
as the states to diminish the chances of clients submitting a claim as well as watching over them 
from a distance to avoid frauds and moral hazards. These techniques bring their clients to be 
morally responsible to risk which contributes to the safeguard of their virtual data but the 
information of their clients as well. 
Despite these results, general guidelines when using a Grounded Theory requires an 
estimated 20 to 30 participants per study. This is required as the goal is to saturate the data 
(Creswell, 1998). However, this research was only able to benefit from 10 participants. Thus, it 
can be argued that the data was not properly saturated as there were not enough participants, and 
they came from only a few positions within the insurance industry. Nonetheless, it is important to 
note that the field of cyber insurance is relatively new to the market, and not many have specialized 
in the subject. This considerably reduced our participant pool. Additionally, some refused to take 
part in the research or ignored the emails altogether; had they not, we would have benefitted from 
a larger selection. Nevertheless, I suspect that the demand for cyber insurance will increase which 
will allow future researches to access a larger pool of participants. This would be made possible 
as the increase in demand will generate a greater number of insurance professionals working with 
cyber insurance. Moreover, the data collected did not allow me to fully answer my initial question. 
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I argue that a greater number of participants would allow me to better understand how insurance 
professionals conceptualize cybercrimes. 
Having a larger number of participants would undoubtedly allow for a greater saturation 
of the data. However, as Ericson and Doyle (2004) mention, “insurers run up against the limits of 
scientific knowledge and its technical applications” (5). This reality is particularly relevant as 
technology is developing at a fast pace and making way to new forms of attacks. For this matter, 
future studies should understand how the new forms of attack generate a level of uncertainty.   
When private insurers and governments pool their risks, they usually gather their security 
needs through discussions of insecurity or past events (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). The rationality of 
risk assessment is not an accurate calculation. The conceptualization of risk and uncertainty can 
be accentuated by fear, a rather human emotion. It is important to remember in future research that 
cybercrime is not only a technological but also a sociological concern. In practice, private 
insurance companies and governments must go beyond the development of technology-related 
security measures. Instead, the innovative nature of cybercrime will require them to understand 
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Applicant means all corporations, organizations or other entities, including subsidiaries, proposed for this insurance. 
1. Name of Applicant: 
Mailing Address: 
City, Prov., Postal Code:    
Year Established:        
Website Home Page Address(es):        
Applicant Company Type:  Public Private Non-Profit Government 
Other (describe)   
Description of Applicant’s Operations:    
 
Applicant’s Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) Code if known (4 digit number): 
 
1. Subsidiary Information: 
 
Name Description of Operations Website Address 
   
   
Attach a separate sheet if necessary. 
2. Are significant changes in the nature or size of the Applicant’s business anticipated over the 
next 12 months, or have there been any such changes in the past 12 months? Yes No 
If Yes, please explain:    
3. Total number of Applicant’s employees (full and part time including leased, 
seasonal and temporary): 
4. Assets/Revenues: 
 
Indicate the following as it relates to 
the Applicant’s fiscal year end (FYE): 
(Please indicate negative figures with 
“(  )” or “-” as appropriate) 
Most Recent FYE 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
Prior FYE 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
Projected FYE 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
Total Assets $ $ $ 
Total Revenue $ $ $ 
Total U.S. Revenue $ $ $ 
Indicate the following as it relates to Most Recent FYE Prior FYE Projected FYE 
II. ORGANIZATION/FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
NOTICE 
ALL LIABILITY COVERAGE PARTS FOR WHICH APPLICATION IS MADE APPLY, SUBJECT TO THEIR TERMS, 
ONLY TO “CLAIMS” FIRST MADE OR DEEMED MADE AGAINST “INSUREDS” DURING THE POLICY PERIOD OR 
ANY EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, IF APPLICABLE. THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY AVAILABLE TO PAY LOSSES 
WILL BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNTS INCURRED, AS “DEFENCE EXPENSES”, AND “DEFENCE EXPENSES” 
WILL BE APPLIED AGAINST THE RETENTION AMOUNT. THE INSURER HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND ANY “CLAIM” 





Travelers Insurance Company of Canada 









the Applicant’s fiscal year end (FYE): 
(Please indicate negative figures with 
“(  )” or “-” as appropriate) 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
(Month/Year) 
(  / ) 
Total Foreign Revenue $ $ $ 
Estimated percentage of revenue derived 










1. Complete the following table for coverages, limits and retentions requested: 
 
Insuring Agreement Requested Limit Requested Retention 
A.   Network and Information Security Liability (Required) $ $ 
B.  Communications and Media Liability $ $ 
C.   Regulatory Defence Expenses $ $ 
   
D.  Crisis Event Management Expenses $ $ 
E.  Security Breach Remediation and Notification Expenses $ $ 
F. Computer Program and Electronic Data Restoration 
Expenses 
$ $ 
G.  Computer Fraud $ $ 
H.   Funds Transfer Fraud $ $ 
I. E-Commerce Extortion $ $ 
J.   Business Interruption and Additional Expenses $ 
Waiting Period in Hours 
Proposed effective date:    
2. What is the Applicant’s preference for defence coverage 
with respect to Insuring Agreements A., B., and C.? Duty to Defend Reimbursement 
3. If Applicant currently has insurance for Errors and Omissions Liability, Network and Security Liability or Media 










  $ $  $ 
  $ $  $ 
Expiring policy number(s):    
4. Within the past 3 years, have any of the coverages or similar coverages been declined, cancelled 
or nonrenewed? Yes No 




1. Does the Applicant have a designated Chief Security Officer as respects computer systems? Yes No 
If No, please indicate what position is responsible for computer security:     
2. Does the Applicant have a formal program in place to test or audit network security controls? Yes No 
a. How often are internal audits performed?    
b. How often are outside/third party audits performed?    
3. Does the Applicant use firewall technology? Yes No 
III. REQUESTED INSURANCE TERMS/CURRENT INSURANCE INFORMATION 








4.   Does the Applicant use anti-virus software? Yes No 
a. Is anti-virus software installed on all of the Applicant’s computer systems, 





5. Does the Applicant use intrusion detection software to detect unauthorized access 





6. Is it the Applicant’s policy to upgrade all security software as new releases or 





7.   Does the Applicant provide remote access to its network? Yes No 
a.   Is remote access restricted to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)? Yes No 
8. Is a multi-factor authentication process (multiple security measures used to reliably 
authenticate/verify the identity of a customer or other authorized user) or a layered 







Please describe authentication/verification methods used:   
 
9. Does the Applicant send or accept financial transactions intended for deposit, via the 
use of remote deposit capture technology (e.g. RDC – Remote Deposit Capture)? Yes No 
10. With respect to computer systems functionality, does the Applicant have: 
a. A disaster recovery plan? Yes No 
b. A business continuity plan? Yes No 
c. An incident response plan for network intrusions and virus incidents? Yes
 No How often are such plans tested? 
11. Does the Applicant have secondary computer system or site available if the primary 
resource becomes inoperative? Yes No 
a. How long before the secondary resources become operational?     
b. What percentage of normal system operations can be handled 
via the secondary resources?    
12. Is all valuable/sensitive data backed-up by the Applicant on a daily basis? Yes No 
If No, please describe exceptions:    
 
PERSONNEL, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
1. Does the Applicant conduct training regarding security issues and procedures for 
employees that utilize computer systems? Yes No 
2. Does the Applicant publish and distribute written computer and information systems policies 
and procedures to its employees? Yes No 
3. Does the Applicant terminate all associated computer access and user accounts as part of the 
regular exit process when an employee leaves the company? Yes No 
4. Does the Applicant have a formal documented procedure in place regarding the creation 
and periodic updating of passwords used by employees or customers? Yes No 
1.   Does the Applicant collect, receive, process, transmit, or maintain private, sensitive, 
or personal information from third parties (i.e. customers, clients, patients) as part of its 
business activities? Yes No 
If Yes, please indicate what type: 
Credit/Debit Card Data  Medical Information Bank Accounts and 
Records Social Insurance/Security Numbers Employee/HR Information
 Customer Information 
Intellectual Property of others Other    







a. Does the Applicant have written procedures in place to comply with laws governing 





b. Does the Applicant share private, sensitive, or personal information gathered from 





2. At any one time, approximately how many individual records containing one or more items of the 
information listed above does the Applicant have stored? 
  
 
<1,000   1,000,001 to 3,000,000 
1,000 to 10,000 3,000,001 to 5,000,000 
10,001 to 100,000 5,000,001 to 7,000,000 
100,001 to 500,000 7,000,001 to 10,000,000 
500,001 to 1,000,000 >10,000,000   
3. Is user-specific, private, sensitive or confidential information stored on Applicant’s server(s) 
encrypted? Yes No 
4. Is user-specific, private, sensitive or confidential information stored on portable communications 
equipment (e.g., laptops, BlackBerry devices, PDAs, USB Flash Drives, or other portable devices)? Yes No 
a. If yes, does Applicant have a company policy or procedure for the secure care, handling and 
storage of private, sensitive or confidential information on portable communications devices? Yes No 
b. If yes, what percentage of user-specific, private, sensitive or confidential information 
stored on portable communications devices is encrypted?   % 
5. Does the Applicant require service providers who may have access to the Applicant’s 
confidential information or personally identifiable information to demonstrate adequate security 
policies and procedures? Yes No 
a. Are service providers required by contract to indemnify the Applicant for harm 
arising from a breach of the provider’s security? Yes No 
 
Website 










Accessible website has log-in capabilities allowing access to secure or restricted 
content (e.g., accounts, subscriptions, or profiles) and/or allows user to upload or 







Transactional website allows orders or purchases using credit card, debit card, 





View account balances or statements   
Transfer funds between accounts   
Bill payment   
1. Does Applicant’s website contain, disseminate, employ or allow the following? 
Please check all that apply: 
Music/Sound clips Chat Rooms/Message Boards/Blogs Executable programs or shareware 
Movies/Movie clips Advertising of others Interactive gaming/games of chance 
Sweepstakes or coupons Sexually explicit material Content specifically targeted at minors 
2. Does the Applicant have a written intellectual property clearance procedure for 
content disseminated via the Applicant’s website? Yes
 No Do the 
procedures include the following: 
a. Review of content by qualified lawyer? Yes No 
b. Screening the content for the following: 
i. Disparagement issues? Yes No 
ii. Copywriting infringement? Yes No 










iii Trademark infringement? Yes No 
iv.   Invasion of privacy? Yes No 
a. Obtaining agreements with outside developers or consultants that include provisions granting 
the Applicant ownership of the intellectual property rights and business methods incorporated 
into any work for hire performed by or on behalf of the Applicant? Yes No 
b. Requiring employees and independent contractors to sign a statement that they will not use 
previous employers’ or clients’ trade secrets or other intellectual property? Yes No 
c. Obtaining written permission of any website the Applicant links to or frames? Yes No 
2. If the Applicant does not have a process to review all content prior to posting, please describe procedures to avoid 
the posting of improper or infringing content:     
 
 
3. Does Applicant have a formal procedure for editing or removing controversial, offensive or infringing 
material from material distributed, broadcast or published by or on behalf of the Applicant? Yes No 
4. Does Applicant collect data about children who use your website? Yes         No 
If Yes, please describe the method used to obtain parental permission:    
 
6. Does the Applicant have a procedure for responding to allegations that content created, 








7. Has the Applicant screened all trademarks used by the Applicant for infringement with existing 





a.   Has the Applicant acquired any trademarks from others in the past 3 years? Yes No 
If Yes, were acquired trademarks screened for infringement? Yes No 
VII. LOSS INFORMATION   
In the past 3 years:   
1. Has the Applicant ever received any claims or complaints, or been subject to any government 
action, investigation or subpoena with respect to allegations of failing to prevent unauthorized 
access to confidential information, failing to notify appropriate individuals of any such unauthorized 









2. Has the Applicant ever received any claims or complaints, or been subject to any government 
action, investigation or subpoena with respect to allegations that any content disseminated on or 
via the Applicant’s websites or company email, infringed on the intellectual property rights of 









If question 1 or 2 is answered Yes, provide details below of each claim, complaint, allegation or incident, including costs, 
losses or damages incurred or paid, any corrective procedures to avoid such allegations in the future and any amounts 

























  $ $ Yes No   
  $ $ Yes No   
  $ $ Yes No   
To enter more information, please attach a separate page to the Application. 
3. Has the Applicant ever experienced an extortion attempt or demand with respect to its 













committed by means of unauthorized or fraudulently entered computer instructions or code 
by someone other than an employee? Yes No 
If Yes, please provide details:     
 
3. Has the Applicant suffered any known intrusions (i.e., unauthorized access or security breach) 
or denial of service attacks which impaired the functionality of its computer systems? Yes No 
If Yes, please provide details:   
 
4. Is the Applicant or any person proposed for this insurance aware of any fact, circumstance, 
situation, event or act that reasonably could give rise to a claim against them under the insurance 
policy for which the Applicant is applying? Yes No 
If Yes, please provide details:    
 
With respect to the information required to be disclosed in response to the questions above, the proposed insurance will not 
afford coverage for any claim arising from any fact, circumstance, situation, event or act about which any executive officer 
of the Applicant had knowledge prior to the issuance of the proposed policy, nor for any person or entity who knew of such 
fact, circumstance, situation, event or act prior to the issuance of the proposed policy. 
 VIII.      REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS  
• Most current audited or annual financial statements if annual revenues exceed $10,000,000 or requested Limit of 
Liability for Network and Information Security Liability coverage exceeds $3,000,000. 
If additional space is needed to address certain questions, attach additional sheets on Applicant’s letterhead as necessary. 
 
THE UNDERSIGNED AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE (PRESIDENT, CEO, CHIEF INFORMATION/SECURITY 
OFFICER OR OTHER OFFICER ACCEPTABLE TO TRAVELERS) OF THE APPLICANT DECLARES THAT TO THE 
BEST OF HIS/HER KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AFTER REASONABLE INQUIRY, THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN 
THE ATTACHED TRAVELERS NEW BUSINESS OR RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE ARE TRUE  AND 
COMPLETE AND MAY BE RELIED UPON BY TRAVELERS. IF THE INFORMATION IN ANY APPLICATION CHANGES 
PRIOR TO THE INCEPTION DATE OF THE POLICY, THE APPLICANT WILL NOTIFY THE INSURER OF SUCH 
CHANGES, AND THE INSURER MAY MODIFY OR WITHDRAW ANY OUTSTANDING QUOTATION. THE INSURER IS 
AUTHORIZED TO MAKE INQUIRY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPLICATION. 
THE SIGNING OF THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT BIND THE INSURER TO OFFER, NOR THE APPLICANT TO 
PURCHASE, THE INSURANCE. IT IS AGREED THAT THIS APPLICATION, INCLUDING ANY MATERIAL SUBMITTED 
THEREWITH, SHALL BE THE BASIS OF THE INSURANCE AND SHALL BE CONSIDERED PHYSICALLY ATTACHED 
TO AND PART OF THE POLICY, IF ISSUED. THE INSURER WILL HAVE RELIED UPON THIS APPLICATION, 
INCLUDING ANY MATERIAL SUBMITTED THEREWITH, IN ISSUING THE POLICY. 
REPRODUCED SIGNATURES WILL BE TREATED AS ORIGINAL. 
 
 
Signature * of Applicant’s Authorized Representative Name (Printed) 







XI. SIGNATURE SECTION 






The policy for which you are applying is written on a claims made and reported basis. Only claims first made 
against the insured and reported to the insurer during the policy period or extended reporting period, if 
applicable, are covered subject to the policy provisions. The limits of liability stated in the policy are reduced, 
and may be exhausted, by claims expenses.  Claims expenses are also applied against your retention, if any.  
If a policy is issued, the application is attached to and made a part of the policy so it is necessary that all 
questions be answered in detail. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please respond to answers clearly.  Underwriters will rely on all statements made in this application.  This  
form must be dated and signed by the CEO, CFO, President, Risk Manager or General Counsel. Completion 
of this submission may require input from your organization’s risk management, information technology, 
finance, and legal departments: 
 
Please note that you may be asked to provide the following information as part of the underwriting process: 
 
➢ Security Supplemental Application based on certain revenue or record counts (over $500mm in  
annual revenues or over 2mm Privacy Information records) 
➢ Most recent annual report, 10K or audited financials 
➢ List of all material litigation threatened or pending (detailing plaintiff’s name, cause(s) of 
action/allegations, and potential damages) which could potentially affect the coverage for which 
applicant is applying 
➢ Descriptions of any acts, errors or omissions which might give rise to a claim(s) under the proposed 
policy 
➢ Loss runs for the last five years 
➢ Copy of your in-house corporate privacy policy(ies) currently in use by your organization 
 
NEED HELP 
If you have any questions about the items asked in this form, please contact your broker or agent. An ACE 
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Part 1 – Company Information 
Company Name 
Click here to enter text. 
Address (City, State, Zip) 
Click here to enter text. 
Applicant Name 
Click here to enter text. 
Title 
Click here to enter text. 
Email Address 
Click here to enter text. 
Phone 
Click here to enter text. 
Company Type 




Click here to enter text. 
Number of Employees 
Click here to enter text. 
Last 12 months gross revenues (% online if 
applicable)  Click here to enter text. 
Projected 12 months gross revenue (% online if 
applicable)  Click here to enter text. 
Primary Company Website(s) 
Click here to enter text. 
Operates outside of the United States 
Please select 
 
Part 2 – Information Privacy and Governance. Which of the following types of Privacy Information (Personal 
Information or Third Party Corporate Information) does your company store, process, transmit or is otherwise 


































f. Does the company maintain a data classification and data governance policy?  ☐Yes  ☐No  Comments 
g. Does the company maintain documentation that clearly identifies the storage and transmission of all Privacy 
Information? ☐Yes ☐No Comments 
h.   When was the company’s privacy policy last reviewed?  as of (date) 
i. (Optional) Additional comments regarding the Information Privacy and Governance: 










Which are the following statements are valid as it relates to Privacy Information Governance. Use the comments 
for clarification as needed. 
j. Does your company encrypt Privacy Information when: 
 








3.   Stored on enterprise assets (e.g., databases, file shares, backups)  Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
4.   Stored with 3
rd 
party services (e.g., cloud)  Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
k. Does your company store Privacy Information on a secure network zone that is segmented from 
internal network Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
l. (Optional) What other technologies are used to secure Privacy Information (e.g., tokenization)? 
Click here to enter text. 
m.  (Optional) Additional comments regarding the Privacy Information Governance:  Click here to enter text. 
 
 
Part 3 - Security Organization 
a.   Does your company have an individual designated for overseeing information security? 
☐Yes ☐No Please enter names and titles 
b.   Does your company have an individual designated for overseeing information privacy? 
☐Yes ☐No 
c. Is your company compliant with any of the following regulatory or compliance frameworks (please check all that 
apply and indicate most recent date of compliance): 
□ ISO17999 as of (date) 
□ SOX as of (date) 
□ PCI-DSS as of (date) 
□ HITECH  as of (date) 
□ HIPAA as of (date) 
□ GLBA  as of (date) 
□ SSAE-16  as of (date) 
□ FISMA  as of (date) 
□ Other  Click here to enter text. 
d. Does your company leverage any industry security frameworks for confidentiality, integrity and availability (e.g., 
NIST, COBIT)?  Click here to enter text. 
e. Is your company an active member in outside security or privacy groups (e.g., ISAC, IAPP, ISACA)? 
Click here to enter text. 
f. (Optional) What percentage of the overall IT budget is allocated for security?  Click here to enter text. 








Part 4 - Information Security.  Use the comments field for clarification as needed. 





b.   Does the company have a disaster recovery and business continuity plan? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
c. Does the company have an Incident Response Plan for determining the severity of a potential data 
security breaches and providing prompt notification to all individuals who may be adversely affected by 
such exposures? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
d. Does the company have an intrusion detection solution that detects and alerts an individual or group 
responsible for reviewing malicious activity on the company network? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
e. Does the company configure firewalls to restrict inbound and outbound network traffic to prevent 
unauthorized access to internal networks? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
f. Does the company perform reviews at least annually of the company’s third-party service providers to 
ensure they adhere to company requirements for data protection? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
g. Does the company use multi-factor authentication for remote network access originating from outside 
the company network by employees and third parties (e.g., VPN, remote desktop)? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
h. Does the company conduct security vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate critical 




i. Does the company install and update an anti-malware solution on all systems commonly affected by 
malicious software (particularly personal computers and servers)? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
j. Does the company use any software or hardware that has been officially retired (i.e., considered “end- 
of-life”) by the manufacturer (e.g., Windows XP)?  If Yes, please list software 
☐Yes 
☐No 
k. Does the company update (e.g., patch, upgrade) commercial software for known security 
vulnerabilities per the manufacturer advice? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
l. Does the company update open source software (e.g., Java, Linux, PHP, Python, OpenSSL) that is 
not commercially supported for known security vulnerabilities? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
m. Does the company have processes established that ensure the proper addition, deletion and 
modification of user accounts and associated access rights? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
n. Does the company enforce passwords that are at least seven characters and contain both numeric 
and alphabetic characters? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
o. Does the company require annual security awareness training for all personnel so they are aware of 
their responsibilities for protecting company information and systems? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
p. Does the company screen potential personnel prior to hire (e.g., background checks include previous 
employment history, drug, criminal record, credit history and reference checks)? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
q. Does the company have a solution to protect mobile devices (e.g., Laptops, iPhones, iPads, Android, 
Tablets) to prevent unauthorized access in the event the device is lost or stolen? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
r. Does the company have entry controls that limit and monitor physical access to company facilities 











Part 5 – Third Party Technology Services (e.g., cloud, web hosting, co-location, managed services) 
a. Is there an individual responsible for the security of the company information that resides at third party 
technology service providers?  Click here to enter text. 
☐Yes 
☐No 
b. Do your third party technology service providers meet required regulatory requirements that are 
required by your company (e.g., PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOX, etc.)? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
c. Does your company perform assessments or audits to ensure third party technology providers meet 
company security requirements? If Yes, when was the last audit completed?   Select date 
☐Yes 
☐No 
d. Does your company have a formal process for reviewing and approving contracts with third party 
technology service providers? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
e. (Optional) Additional comments regarding the Third Party Technology Services: 





Part 6 - Current Network & Technology Providers (if applicable and required at time of binding) 
Internet Communication Services 
Click here to enter text. 
Credit Card Processor(s) 
Click here to enter text. 
Website Hosting 
Click here to enter text. 
Other Providers (e.g., Human Resource, Point of Sale) 
Click here to enter text. 
Collocation Services 
Click here to enter text. 
Anti-virus Software 
Click here to enter text. 
Managed Security Services 
Click here to enter text. 
Firewall Technology 
Click here to enter text. 
Broadband ASP Services 
Click here to enter text. 
Intrusion Detection Software 
Click here to enter text. 
Outsourcing Services 
Click here to enter text. 
Cloud Services (e.g., Amazon, Salesforce, Office365) 
Click here to enter text. 
Please complete the following information for cloud services you process or store Privacy Information. Use the 
optional comments if more space is required: 
Cloud Provider Type Service # of Records Encrypted Storage 
Click here to enter text. Select Select Click here to enter text. Select 
Click here to enter text. Select Select Click here to enter text. Select 
Click here to enter text. Select Select Click here to enter text. Select 
















Part 7 – Internet Media Information (only required if Internet Media Coverage is being requested) 
a.   Please list the domain names for which coverage is requested:  Click here to enter text. 
b. Has legal counsel screened the use of all trademarks and service marks, including your use of domain 
names and metatags, to ensure they do not infringe on the intellectual property of others? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
c. Do you obtain written permissions or releases from third party content providers and contributors, 
including freelancers, independent contractors, and other talent? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
d. Do you require indemnification or hold harmless agreements from third parties (including outside 





e. If you sell advertising space on any of your websites, are providers of advertisements required to 




f. Have your privacy policy, terms of use, terms of service, and other customer policies been reviewed 
by counsel? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
g. Do you involve legal counsel in reviewing content prior to publication or in evaluating whether it should 
be removed when notified that content is defamatory, infringing, in violation of a third party’s privacy 




h.   Does your website include content directed at children under the age of 18?  Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
i. Do you collect data about children who use your website?  Do you obtain parental consent regarding 
your collection of data about children who use your website? Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
j. Please describe your company’s process to review content prior to publication to avoid the posting, publishing 
or dissemination of content that is defamatory, infringing, in violation of a third party’s privacy rights or 
otherwise:  Click here to enter text. 
k. Please describe your review and takedown procedure when notified that content is defamatory, infringing, in 
violation of a third party’s privacy rights or otherwise improper:  Click here to enter text. 













Part 8 - Current Loss Information. In the past 5 years has the company ever experienced any of the following 
events or incidents?   Please check all that apply.  Please use the comments below to describe any current losses. 
a. Company was declined for Privacy, Cyber, Network, or similar insurance, or had an existing policy 
cancelled (Missouri applicants do not answer this question) Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
b. Company, its directors, officers, employees or any other person or entity proposed for insurance has 




c. Company has been the subject of an investigation or action by any regulatory or administrative 
agency for violations arising out of your advertising or sales activities Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
d. Company sustained a loss of revenue due to a systems intrusion, denial-of-service, tampering, 
malicious code attack or other type of cyber attack Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 




f. Company had to notify customers or offer credit monitoring that their personal information was or may 
have been compromised as a result of the your activities Comments 
☐Yes 
☐No 
g. Company received a complaint concerning the content of the company website or other online 








i. (Optional) Additional comments regarding Current Loss Information:  Click here to enter text. 
 
 
Part 9:   Current Coverage.  Which of the following policies does the company currently have in force: 
□  General Liability Policy □ Cyber / Privacy Liability  Policy 
□  D&O Policy □ Other Related Policy (not listed) 
□  Professional Liability □ Crime 






 FRAUD WARNING STATEMENTS  
 
NOTICE TO ALABAMA APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
presents a false or fraudulent claim for payment of a loss or 
benefit or who knowingly presents false information in an 
application for insurance is guilty of a crime and may be subject 
to restitution fines or confinement in prison, or any combination 
thereof. 
 
NOTICE     TO ARKANSAS, LOUISIANA, RHODE ISLAND AND WEST 
VIRGINIA APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly presents a false 
or fraudulent claim for payment of a loss or benefit or knowingly 
presents false information in an application for insurance is guilty 
of a crime and may be subject to fines and confinement in prison. 
 
NOTICE TO COLORADO APPLICANTS: It is unlawful to knowingly 
provide false, incomplete, or misleading facts or information to an 
insurance company for the purpose of defrauding or attempting 
to defraud the company. Penalties may include imprisonment, 
fines, denial of insurance, and civil damages. Any insurance 
company or agent of an insurance company who knowingly 
provides false, incomplete, or misleading facts or information to a 
policyholder or claimant for the purpose of defrauding or 
attempting to defraud the policyholder or claimant with regard to 
a settlement or award payable from insurance proceeds shall be 
reported to the Colorado Division of Insurance within the 
Department of Regulatory Agencies. 
 
NOTICE TO DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPLICANTS: WARNING: It  is 
a crime to provide false or misleading information to an insurer 
for the purpose of defrauding the insurer or any other person. 
Penalties include imprisonment and/or fines. In addition, an 
insurer may deny insurance benefits, if false information 
materially related to a claim was provided by the applicant. 
 
NOTICE TO FLORIDA APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly and 
with intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer files a 
statement of claim or an application containing any false, 
incomplete or misleading information is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
 
NOTICE TO KANSAS APPLICANTS: Any person who, knowingly and 
with intent to defraud, presents, causes to be presented or 
prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be presented to or by 
an insurer, purported insurer, broker or any agent thereof, any 
written statement as part of, or in support of, an application for 
the issuance of, or the rating of an insurance policy for personal 
or commercial insurance, or a claim for payment or other benefit 
pursuant to an insurance policy for commercial or personal 
insurance which such person knows to contain materially false 
information concerning any fact material thereto; or conceals, for 
the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact 
material thereto commits a fraudulent insurance act. 
 
NOTICE TO KENTUCKY APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
and with intent to defraud any insurance company or other person 
files an application for insurance containing any materially  false  
information  or  conceals,  for  the  purpose    of 
misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto 
commits a fraudulent insurance act, which is a crime. 
 
NOTICE TO MAINE APPLICANTS: It is a crime to  knowingly  provide 
false, incomplete or misleading information to an insurance 
company for the purpose of defrauding the company. Penalties 
may include imprisonment, fines or a denial of insurance benefits. 
 
NOTICE TO MARYLAND APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly  or 
willfully presents a false or fraudulent claim for payment of a loss 
or benefit or who knowingly or willfully presents false information 
in an application for insurance is guilty of a crime and may be 
subject to fines and confinement in prison. 
 
NOTICE TO MINNESOTA APPLICANTS: A person who submits an 
application or files a claim with intent to defraud or helps commit 
a fraud against an insurer is guilty of a crime. 
 
NOTICE TO NEW JERSEY APPLICANTS: Any person who includes 
any false or misleading information on an application for an 
insurance policy is subject to criminal and civil penalties. 
 
NOTICE TO NEW MEXICO APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
presents a false or fraudulent claim for payment of a loss or 
benefit or knowingly presents false information in an application 
for insurance is guilty of a crime and may be subject to civil fines 
and criminal penalties. 
 
NOTICE TO NEW YORK APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
and with intent to defraud any insurance company or other person 
files an application for insurance or statement of claim containing 
any materially false information, or conceals for the purpose of 
misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto, 
commits a fraudulent insurance act, which is a crime, and shall 
also be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand 
dollars and the stated value of the claim for each such violation. 
 
NOTICE TO OHIO APPLICANTS: Any person who, with intent to 
defraud or knowing that he/she is facilitating a fraud against an 
insurer, submits an application or files a claim containing a false 
or deceptive statement is guilty of insurance fraud. 
 
NOTICE TO OKLAHOMA APPLICANTS: WARNING: Any person  who 
knowingly, and with intent to injure, defraud or deceive any 
insurer, makes any claim for the proceeds of an insurance policy 
containing any false, incomplete or misleading information is 
guilty of a felony. 
 
NOTICE TO OREGON APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly and 
with intent to defraud any insurance company or another person 
files an application for insurance or statement of claim  containing 
any materially false information, or conceals for the purpose of 
misleading information concerning any fact material thereto, may 
be committing a fraudulent insurance act, which may be a crime 






NOTICE   TO   PENNSYLVANIA   APPLICANTS:      Any   person who 
knowingly and with intent to defraud any insurance company or 
other person files an application for insurance or statement of 
claim containing any materially false information or conceals for 
the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact 
material thereto, commits a fraudulent insurance act, which is a 
crime and subjects such person to criminal and civil penalties. 
 
NOTICE TO VERMONT APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
presents a false statement in an application for insurance may be 
guilty of a criminal offense and subject to penalties under state 
law. 
 
NOTICE     TO     TENNESSEE,     VIRGINIA     AND    WASHINGTON 
APPLICANTS: It is a crime to knowingly provide false,  incomplete 
or misleading information to an insurance company for the 
purpose of defrauding the company. Penalties include 
imprisonment, fines and denial of insurance benefits. 
 
NOTICE TO ALL OTHER APPLICANTS: Any person who knowingly 
and with intent to defraud any insurance company or another 
person, files an application for insurance or statement of claim 
containing any materially false information, or conceals 
information for the purpose of misleading, commits a fraudulent 
insurance act, which is a crime and may subject such person to 
criminal and civil penalties 
 
 DECLARATION AND CERTIFICATION  
 
SIGNATURE – FOR ALL APPLICANTS (REQUIRED)  
 
Signed:  (must be Officer of Applicant) 
Print Name & Title:    
Date (MM/DD/YY):    
Email/Phone:    
 
 SIGNATURE - FOR ARKANSAS, MISSOURI, AND WYOMING APPLICANTS ONLY  
 
PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE AND SIGN THE FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE TO YOUR APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE: 
 
I understand and acknowledge that the policy for which i am applying contains a defense within limits provision which 
means that claims expenses will reduce my limits of liability and may exhaust them completely.  Should that occur, I shall 
be liable for any further claims expenses and damages. 
 
Applicant’s Signature (Arkansas, Missouri, & Wyoming Applicants, In Addition To Application Signature Above): 
Signed:  (must be Officer of Applicant) 
Print Name & Title:    
Date (MM/DD/YY):    
Email/Phone:    
 
 FOR FLORIDA APPLICANTS ONLY:   FOR IOWA APPLICANTS ONLY:  
Agent Name:    Broker:    
Agent License ID Number:    Address:    
 
